The Currency of Ideas

McNamara, Kathleen R.

doi:10.7591/9781501711930

Cited by 201 publications

(42 citation statements)

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“…It focuses attention instead on the ‘archeology’ of the discourse, or how EU leaders are caught by the dominant discourse of their culture or their institution—in this case by ordo‐liberalism (Foucault ). This applied well to the bankers of the ECB up until recently and still largely does to the economists and bankers of Germany's Bundesbank, so immersed in the discourse and practice of ordo‐liberalism and its anti‐inflation philosophy (MacNamara ) that they had been long deaf to pleas to promote growth, and seemingly ignored the dangers of deflation. This is about the hold of old ideas that can't be dislodged because they are so fundamental to actors' understanding of events—and themselves.…”

Section: The Content Of Ideas and Discourse About The Eurozone Crisismentioning

confidence: 92%

Speaking to the Markets or to the People? A Discursive Institutionalist Analysis of the EU's Sovereign Debt Crisis

Schmidt¹

2013

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

166

128

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Uses 'discursive institutionalism' as its analytic framework, by focusing on the wide range of EU leaders' ideas about the crisis and how they have communicated about them. • Examines the different ways in which the scholarly literature analyzes those ideas and discursive interactions, and how they lead one to consider different aspects of the crisis. • Argues that there are disconnects between what EU leaders say to one another in the 'coordinative discourse' at the EU level and between what they say about those agreements to the markets and to the people in the 'communicative discourse'. • Suggests, with regard to the markets specifically, that EU leaders have proposed solutions that were seen as too little too late; were considered to be the wrong solutions; or raised new contingencies that the markets themselves had not anticipated. • Shows, with regard to the people, that EU leaders' communication of the wrong or misleading messages meant that national publics were often not prepared for the reform initiatives taken, and that this has often left the field open to the extremes of the right and left. The EU's sovereign debt crisis is not just economic; it is also political, resulting from the failure of EU leaders to offer solutions that calm the markets and convince the people. These failures stem from problems with EU leaders' ideas about how to solve the crisis as well as their communication about them. That communication encompasses not just EU leaders talking to one another in negotiations of crisis solutions but also speaking to 'the markets' and to 'the people' about those solutions, all of which may interact in perverse ways. This article uses the analytic framework of 'discursive institutionalism' to consider the different forms, types, levels, rates and mechanisms of change in ideas followed by the EU leaders' discursive interactions in the 'coordinative' discourse and their 'communicative discourse' to the global markets and European publics. It uses a range of country cases, but in particular Germany and France, in illustration.

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Section: The Content Of Ideas and Discourse About The Eurozone Crisismentioning

confidence: 92%

Speaking to the Markets or to the People? A Discursive Institutionalist Analysis of the EU's Sovereign Debt Crisis

Schmidt¹

2013

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

166

128

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…In reference to European monetary union in particular, nation states, especially Germany (Chang 2002;Heisenberg 1998;Kaltenthaler 2002;Loedel 1999;Moravcsik 1998), and ideas (Dyson and Featherstone 1999;McNamara 1998;Verdun 1999) have been the primary explanatory variables for the timing, pace and content of monetary integration. Though economic, ideational and organizational factors play a role, all of the aforementioned theories to varying degrees have given Germany pride of place in explaining why EMU occurred and why it looks the way that it does.…”

Section: Country Size and Policy Optionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yves Mersch of the ECB's Governing Council stated, "It is the opinion of the Bundesbank that the Pact, with the new rules, has been critically weakened," warning that this would have consequences for monetary policy (Die Welt, 3/23/2005) The efficacy of linking up with the ECB in order to alter monetary policy is questionable, however. Much of the influence of its predecessor, the Bundesbank, rest not with its official position but with its reputation, record of success, and the perception that is possessed superior ideas and information in regard to monetary policymaking that enabled it to form relationships with other influential actors, including the financial community (Bernhard 1998;Goodman 1992;Heisenberg 1998;Kaelberer 2003;McNamara 1998). The ECB does not have the same track record or comparable influence in regard to its ideas.…”

Section: German Leadership Will Monetary Cooperation Stagnate and Bementioning

confidence: 99%

“…By the late 1980s, monetary politics in the EC followed the lead of West Germany, whose currency formed the unofficial anchor of the system. Ideas regarding the long-term tradeoff between inflation and unemployment were replaced by a consensus on the need for low inflation in order to be able to keep interest rates low, thus spurring economic growth (McNamara 1998). The Maastricht Treaty thus demanded convergence in inflation, exchange rates, interest rates, debts and deficits for the participants, though countries could be approaching the required levels and still be admitted to EMU, so long as the other Member States agreed (as was the case for Italy and Belgium).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact: Size and Influence in EMU Policymaking

Chang

2006

Journal of European Integration

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The Stability and Growth Pact, originally designed to protect the integrity of monetary union based on price stability and fiscal discipline, has created a rift between states and institutions. Larger states like Germany and France have repeatedly violated the terms of the pact, while smaller states like the Netherlands and Austria have steadfastly defended it. This paper explores how size has affected the economic interests of the Eurozone countries and how these interests will translate into policy changes, taking into account the possibility of coalitions forming between states as well as across institutions, with the European Central Bank taking the position of the smaller states in defending the original pact.

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“…rational expectations economics were crucial to making this design seem practicable (Dyson and Featherstone 1997;McNamara 1998;Hall 2012).…”

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confidence: 99%