The Cycle of Violence: Understanding Individual Participation in Collective Violence

Abstract

Why do “ordinary” people engage in collective violence, harming others on behalf of their group? In this article, we argue that the violent group itself, and the identity it bestows on participating members, is an often overlooked and yet fundamental source of motivation for an individual's participation in collective violence. Reviewing insights from social and moral psychology, military history, and public health, we outline how the psychology of individual violent behavior presents a puzzle. For an ordinary person, participation in violence is often an aversive and distressing experience, and yet violent behavior leads to more violence in the future. A better understanding of the dynamics of collective violence allows us to make sense of this paradox. Violent groups can promote violent behavior among members by increasing members' motivation to engage in violence, particularly through group identification and deliberate strategies, and by removing psychological obstacles to violence (i.e., by making violence less aversive). Our synthesis of the literature points to a cycle of individuals' participation in collective violence, in which group identification motivates violent behavior and violent behavior increases identification with violent groups.

Who is more violent in extremist groups? A comparison of leaders and followers

“…Engagement in political violence is counter-normative and perpetrators of such acts are disavowed by most members of society. Even when violence is committed in the service of deeply held ideological convictions, it still imposes major psychological costs on individuals (Fiske & Rai, 2014;Littman & Paluck, 2015). Given that it is psychologically difficult to kill or injure another person, some aspects of a high-status position may make this task easier for leaders than for followers.…”

Traços de personalidade de adolescentes infratores e vitimizados por meio do Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Junior (EPQ-J)

“…A cada época ela se manifesta de formas e em contextos diferentes. Contudo, seu incremento na atualidade configura-se como aspecto representativo e problemático da organização da vida social, sendo considerada uma das principais causas de morte de pessoas entre 15 e 44 anos em todo o mundo, além das inúmeras sequelas biopsicossociais em nível individual e coletivo (DeVerteuil, 2015;Littman & Paluck, 2015).…”

The role of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards in committing violence during combat: A cross‐sectional study with former combatants in the DR Congo

“…Political variables include, for example, the influence of military weakness (Wood, 2010), military strategy (Kalyvas, 1999), or measures to destroy the support base of the opposing party (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Again others have examined the idea that combatants might also be reinforced to engage in violent behavior by incentivizing such behavior with rewards (Littman & Paluck, 2015). Again others have examined the idea that combatants might also be reinforced to engage in violent behavior by incentivizing such behavior with rewards (Littman & Paluck, 2015).…”

“…These can be defined as rewards that are tangible and visible to others (Mottaz, 1985) and are as numerous as the number of objects that people desire. At the same time, they may also condone or actively encourage looting as a way to provide additional extrinsic rewards (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) or withdraw extrinsic rewards as a form of punishment for failing to participate in violence (Littman & Paluck, 2015). At the same time, they may also condone or actively encourage looting as a way to provide additional extrinsic rewards (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) or withdraw extrinsic rewards as a form of punishment for failing to participate in violence (Littman & Paluck, 2015).…”

“…Commanders in armed groups can, for instance, offer money and goods such as food, clothing, better housing, sexual partners, territory, drugs, weapons, and access to natural resources (e.g., Gat, 2000;Kruger & Nesse, 2004;Palmer & Tilley, 1995;Weekes-Shackelford et al, 2003;Weinstein, 2007). At the same time, they may also condone or actively encourage looting as a way to provide additional extrinsic rewards (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) or withdraw extrinsic rewards as a form of punishment for failing to participate in violence (Littman & Paluck, 2015). An important advantage connected to the use of these extrinsic rewards, is that they not only incentivize violent behavior of individual combatants (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006) but distributing them can also overcome the well-known collective action problem that many armed groups face, that is, motivating people to join the group even if it can result in death or harm (e.g., Keen, 2000).…”