The Cycles of Decrees: Evidence From the Italian Parliament 1

Abstract

This research provides an empirical test of the predictions of the Political Legislation Cycle theory about decrees using disaggregated data made recently available by official databanks of the Italian Republic. The analysis focuses on the five different types of decrees for which long enough data series are available: law-decrees (decreti legge), legislative decrees (decreti legislativi), DPR (decrees of the President of the Republic), implementing decrees (decreti attuativi) and independent decrees (decreti indipendenti). Multiple sources of latent heterogeneity affect the production of decrees due to multilevel factors that operate jointly with observed covariates at all levels of the hierarchy of the data. We account for these factors by estimating a multilevel negative binomial regression model with random effects on the mean for repeated measurements of disaggregated counts of decrees, implemented under multiple Italian governments, nested within the first 17 legislatures of the Italian Republic. The estimates of the model broadly confirm the theory’s prediction that decrees tend to be approved in the earlier stages of the legislature; this prediction receives stronger support the more the institutional characteristics of each type of decree resemble those of the theoretical variable. Finally, the analysis confirms the prediction of the PLC theory about the legislators’ choice of the legislative instruments through which they satisfy the conflicting interests of special interest groups and voters, shedding light on the timing of the activities of lobbies. JEL classification codes: D72, C49, H61, H62