The dark side of cognitive illusions: When an illusory belief interferes with the acquisition of evidence‐based knowledge

Abstract

Cognitive illusions are often associated with mental health and well‐being. However, they are not without risk. This research shows they can interfere with the acquisition of evidence‐based knowledge. During the first phase of the experiment, one group of participants was induced to develop a strong illusion that a placebo medicine was effective to treat a fictitious disease, whereas another group was induced to develop a weak illusion. Then, in Phase 2, both groups observed fictitious patients who always took the bogus treatment simultaneously with a second treatment which was effective. Our results showed that the group who developed the strong illusion about the effectiveness of the bogus treatment during Phase 1 had more difficulties in learning during Phase 2 that the added treatment was effective.

Superstition predicts perception of illusory control

“…With respect to mood and locus of control, neither predicted causal ratings; in particular, no evidence of a depressive realism effect was observed (see also Allan, Siegel, & Hannah, 2007). The present data make an important additional contribution to the superstition literature by examining the operation of basic causal learning mechanisms that are often assumed to be related to superstitions (see Blanco et al, 2015;Yarritu, Matute, & Luque, 2015). While numerous studies have examined whether particular groups of people are more or less likely to endorse superstitious beliefs (see Irwin, 1993 for a review), or have investigated general cognitive factors or deficits thought to be related to superstitious thinking (for reviews see French, 1992;Wiseman & Watt, 2006), there has been relatively little work examining the basic cognitive mechanisms by which people might arrive at superstitious or paranormal beliefs, and whether these cognitive mechanisms differ across individuals.…”

“…Participants reporting high levels of superstitious beliefs tended to rate the button press as having caused the light to illuminatea causal illusionwhereas those with low superstition were less susceptible to this illusion and tended to (correctly) see the events as unrelated. The present data make an important additional contribution to the superstition literature by examining the operation of basic causal learning mechanisms that are often assumed to be related to superstitions (see Blanco et al, 2015;Yarritu, Matute, & Luque, 2015). The relationship held both for the magnitude of people's causal judgements (i.e., the degree of causality people saw the button press as possessing) and also the propensity to infer causation (i.e., whether people saw a causal relationship between the two events, irrespective of its magnitude).…”

Individual differences are more than a gene × environment interaction: The role of learning.

“…Specifically, participants were told that over a set of discrete trials they could test whether their actions caused a given outcome. In a zero-contingency task, programmed so that the outcome happened equally Individual Differences 36 often in response to and in the absence of the participants' actions, non-depressed participants tended to overestimate the contingency between action and outcome, while individuals with mild symptoms of depression accurately judged the zero contingency (see also, Yarritu, Matute, & Luque, 2015;Yarritu, Matute, & Vadillo, 2014).…”

“…Specifically, participants were told that over a set of discrete trials they could test whether their actions caused a given outcome. In a zero-contingency task, programmed so that the outcome happened equally Individual Differences 36 often in response to and in the absence of the participants' actions, non-depressed participants tended to overestimate the contingency between action and outcome, while individuals with mild symptoms of depression accurately judged the zero contingency (see also, Yarritu, Matute, & Luque, 2015;Yarritu, Matute, & Vadillo, 2014).A normative measure of the contingency between action and outcome (ΔP), describes the strength and direction of a contingent relationship in terms of the difference between the probability of the outcome occurring following an action, P(o|e) and the probability of the outcome occurring in the absence of the action (i.e., effect), P(o|~e), as shown in Figure 3 (Allan, 1980). Judgements of control are broadly sensitive to manipulations of the statistical contingency between an action and an outcome (e.g., Baker, Murphy, Vallee-Tourangeau, 1996;Shanks, 1987;Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh & Baker, 1993).…”

Blaming Bill Gates AGAIN! Misuse, overuse and misunderstanding of performance data in sport

“…Therefore, as diverse technology becomes increasingly applied to sport performance, coaches will need to understand and focus more on the crucial mechanisms that are accurate and most informative towards the task at hand. Once again, this will not be an easy challenge since it is difficult for individuals to depart from a strongly held view, even when it is to be replaced by one with a strong evidence base (Yarritu, Matute, & Luque, 2015).…”