The Deadliest of Games: The Institution of Dueling

Kingston, Christopher; Wright, Robert E.

doi:10.4284/sej.2010.76.4.1094

Cited by 13 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…In addition to Volckart's work, two recent papers (Allen and Reed, 2006;Kingston and Wright, 2010) have presented efficiency explanations for dueling. 3 However, these papers address only the motivation of a rational individual duelist and neglect the broader question of dueling as a transitional social institution, an issue that has been discussed extensively by social historians and legal scholars.…”

Section: The State Of Art On Duel Of Honor In Economic Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…32). Kingston and Wright (2010) neglected this transitional character, describing dueling as a signal about an unobservable intangible asset: personal creditworthiness. Their model assumes that an 'honorable' man is one who can be trusted to repay loans.…”

Section: The State Of Art On Duel Of Honor In Economic Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Their model assumes that an 'honorable' man is one who can be trusted to repay loans. It also assumes that "there is no formal enforcement mechanism in place" (Kingston andWright, 2010, p. 1098)but dueling does exist as a transitional phenomenon under conditions of contradictory orders, such as incomplete formal state enforcement coexisting either with informal aristocratic community enforcement or military enforcement (a state within the state) as in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century.…”

Section: The State Of Art On Duel Of Honor In Economic Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Because insufficient evidence is available to simulate agents' behaviors in detail, we used a minimalistic approach, including only the modules, behaviors, and actions that can be supported by historical evidence. Some previous research has focused on the pre-engagement decision of dueling (Kingston and Wright, 2010), here, we focus on how the dueling engagement decision is made in the presence of a conflictual situation between two agents. Borrowing from Boulding (1962), our model assumes three main levels in decision-making: 1) the individual; 2) the group; and 3) the organization.…”

Section: Theoretical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The role of identity and authority from anarchy to order: Insights from modeling the trajectory of dueling in Europe

Vahabi

Hassani-Mahmooei

2016

Economic Modelling

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Economic literature usually assumes order in terms of a Weberian state with monopoly over the means of violence. In this paper, we study historical situations in which such an order is absent and violent conflict namely duel of honor is an institution. Anarchy or the absence of state rules in managing violence does not imply the absence of private rules and arrangements (such as codes of dueling). Our focus is on the possible ways that a Weberian order can emerge from anarchy. We endeavor to capture this transition by introducing a computational model in which a simulated agent represents a social individual who considers both economic and political factors and interacts with other individuals as well as institutions to make a decision. We then use the trajectory of dueling in England, France, and Germany to validate our approach. The paper demonstrates how a complex, aggregative historical process over three centuries may be consistently explained on the basis of rational choices among heterogeneous agents conditioned by their group identity and State authority.

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Section: The State Of Art On Duel Of Honor In Economic Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The State Of Art On Duel Of Honor In Economic Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The State Of Art On Duel Of Honor In Economic Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The role of identity and authority from anarchy to order: Insights from modeling the trajectory of dueling in Europe

Vahabi

Hassani-Mahmooei

2016

Economic Modelling

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“…While some scholars have studied the pre-engagement decision of dueling (Kingston and Wright, 2010), in this paper we focus on how the dueling engagement decision is made in the presence of a conflictual situation between two agents. Borrowing upon Boulding (1962), our model assumes three main levels in decision-making, namely 1) the individual; 2) the group; and 3) the organization.…”

Section: A Modeled Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Identity, Authority and Evolution of Order: The Trajectory of Dueling Simulated

Hassani-Mahmooei

Vahabi

2013

SSRN Journal

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Borrowing from public choice literature, while aristocratic civil wars can be regarded as anarchy, and the monopoly of violence by the state as Leviathan, duel of honor is an orderly anarchy. The sudden or gradual withering of duel of honor as an institution marks the transition to the monopoly of violence by the state in Europe. In this paper, we endeavor to capture this transition by introducing a computational model where a simulated agent considers three sets of factors to make its dueling decision: 1) its own characteristics such as dueling skill; 2) its identity such as the reaction received from other members of its own social group; and finally 3) the reaction of the authority such as the possible punishment that could be inflicted by the state against dueler. These factors then interact through a dynamic utility function affected by both optimization and learning processes. The results of our agent-based computational model which are validated against the historical evidence from England, France, and Germany show that a complex, aggregative historical process may be consistently explained on the basis of rational choice of heterogeneous individual agents conditioned by their group identity and authority (organizational) influence.

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Dueling

Myers¹

2013

The Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice

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A duel is a prearranged battle stemming from a prior insult, accusation, or quarrel, fought between two persons using deadly weapons. At stake in a duel is the honor of the challenger, whose reputation has been publicly brought into question. In its time, one's honor in the community and reputation for good character were the “credit” on which all dealings whether in personal relationships or in commerce were based. The delicate rules of the ritual were outlined in a Code Duello, which describes every step of the protocol.

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The Deadliest of Games: The Institution of Dueling

Cited by 13 publications

References 17 publications

The role of identity and authority from anarchy to order: Insights from modeling the trajectory of dueling in Europe

The role of identity and authority from anarchy to order: Insights from modeling the trajectory of dueling in Europe

Identity, Authority and Evolution of Order: The Trajectory of Dueling Simulated

Dueling

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