“…Instead, his argument takes the form of claiming that the attempt to make general normative comparisons of humans and animals involves, as we might put it, a category mistake. Some anti-speciesists have also claimed that animal rights sceptics commit the category mistake of holding that only moral agents are morally considerable, thereby failing to see that not only moral agents can be moral patients (e.g., Cavalieri 2009;Regan 1983). However, the criterion by which moral patient-hood is ascribed to individuals by many anti-speciesists is vulnerable to a serious objection.This objection further points to a problem with their particular manner of criticising claims of human superiority, which involves a rejection of the idea that species-membership (or, as I will say below, kind) has any moral relevance in determining the moral considerability of individuals (or the ways in which individuals can be harmed or wronged).…”