The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment

Abstract

A leader's culpability for involving his state in a conflict affects both his war termination calculus and his domestic audience's willingness to punish him if he loses. I define a culpable leader as any leader who either presides over the beginning of a war, or comes to power midwar and shares a political connection with a culpable predecessor. Using a data set created specifically for this study, I find that culpable leaders are more likely than nonculpable ones to achieve favorable war outcomes. I also find that domestic audiences will be willing to punish culpable leaders who lose, yet spare nonculpable leaders who do the same. Taken together, my findings underscore the need to appreciate more fully the role individual leaders play in bringing their states to war.

The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations

“…Hafner-Burton et al 2014. For examples beyond the special issue, see Byman and Pollack 2001;Colgan 2013;Croco 2011;Debs and Goemans 2010;Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012;Horowitz, McDermott, and Stam 2005;Saunders 2009;Weeks 2012. level heterogeneity also opens up opportunities to connect with a wider body of behavioral research in political science, including studies of public opinion. A number of contributions to this issue pursue this approach.…”

Foreign military intervention and post-colonial state-building: An actor-centric analysis

“…contrast, Croco (2011) finds that culpable democratic leaders, or those who were in power when the war broke out and oversaw its initial conduct, have a much higher probability of losing office following a war defeat than non-democratic leaders. Croco and Weeks (2013) similarly find that culpable democratic leaders have a near certain chance of losing office within two years of a war defeat while even the most culpable non-democratic leaders stand less than a 40% chance of being removed from power.…”

Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2015

“…Foreign Aff airs experienced the same international pressure during an Afghan summit in London, which was followed by a formal NATO request to prolong the mission. Croco (2011) argues that punishment is inevitable for leaders who deliver less than victory. Additionally, one of the government's coalition members, the social democrats, demanded to stick to earlier agreements about an end date of the Dutch contribution to the mission.…”