The Decline of Arranged Marriage? Marital Change and Continuity in India

Allendorf, Keera; Pandian, Roshan K.

doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2016.00149.x

Cited by 120 publications

(111 citation statements)

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“…The fit between gender schemas and DI may also help explain variation in the decline of arranged marriage across contexts. Arranged marriages are still common in South Asia (Allendorf & Pandian, in press), whereas the practice seems to have declined substantially in Southeast Asia and Sub‐Saharan Africa (Caldwell et al, ; Jones & Yeung, ; Meekers, ). Arranged marriage may have declined substantially in Southeast Asia and Sub‐Saharan Africa because those regions do not share all three South Asian gender schemas described in this article.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict and Compatibility? Developmental Idealism and Gendered Differences in Marital Choice

Allendorf

2016

J of Marriage and Family

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Conflict and Compatibility? Developmental Idealism and Gendered Differences in Marital ChoiceDevelopmental idealism (DI) theory suggests that individuals who endorse DI schemas about marriage are more likely to choose their own spouses and do so for love. Such DI schemas conflict with South Asian gender schemas about marriage for women, but not for men. In turn, such conflict and compatibility may create gender differences in incorporating DI into expectations and experiences of marital choice and love in South Asia. Connections between endorsing DI as an abstract model of the world and using DI as a concrete guide for marriage may also differ by gender. Using survey data from Nepal, the author finds that men are more likely than women to expect to choose their own spouse and do so for love. Their parents' expectations show the same gender differences. Men are also more likely to choose their own spouses in practice. Connections between abstract and concrete DI are not stronger among men though.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict and Compatibility? Developmental Idealism and Gendered Differences in Marital Choice

Allendorf

2016

J of Marriage and Family

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“…Caste homogamy characterizes the marriage market in India not only in arranged marriages but also in love marriages (Banerjee et al, 2013;Allendorf and Pandian, 2016). Dugar et al (2012), however, find that the probability of a higher-caste female considering a lower-caste match increases with an increase in the monthly income of a low-caste male.…”

Section: Assortative Matingmentioning

confidence: 93%

Marriage Markets in Developing Countries

Anukriti

Dasgupta

2017

The Oxford Handbook of Women and the Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Marriage Markets in Developing Countries FebruAry 2017Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5-9 53113 Bonn, GermanyPhone: +49-228-3894-0 Email: publications@iza.org www.iza.org IZA -Institute of Labor EconomicsDiscussion PaPer series IZA DP No. 10556 Marriage Markets in Developing CountriesFebruAry 2017 S AnukritiBoston College and IZA Shatanjaya DasguptaBeloit College Marriage Markets in Developing Countries 1This chapter reviews the literature on marriage in developing countries. We describe how marital matching occurs; the trends in age at marriage; assortative mating patterns; marriage payments; and spousal decision-making after a marriage has occurred. Lastly, we discuss trends and rationales for consanguineous and polygamous marriages -practices that are largely unique to the developing world. JEL Classification:J1, J12

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“…The resulting marriages are neither fully arranged nor fully self‐chosen (Banerji and Vanneman ). In India, for instance, marriages arranged by parents without the consent of their daughters have declined, but what has increased the most are parent‐arranged marriages with the daughter's consent, resulting in a hybridization of customary Western and Indian practices (Allendorf and Pandian ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Household Determinants of Teen Marriage: Sister Effects Across Four Low‐ and Middle‐Income Countries

Pesando¹,

Abufhele²

2019

Studies in Family Planning

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This article investigates the household determinants of teen marriage in Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Vietnam using data from the international Young Lives study tracking a cohort of children from the ages of 8-19 over a 15-year period. First, we offer a descriptive and comparative overview of the prevalence of teen marriage among girls in geographically selected areas of the four countries, together with their sociodemographic determinants. Second, we place a specific focus on the role of gender and sibling sex-composition in shaping the probability of getting married by age 19. Drawing on the significant crosscountry heterogeneity in household context, direction of marriage payments, and prevalence of arranged marriage, we test hypotheses relating to the availability of economic resources within the household and cultural norms surrounding the order and timing of marriage. We show that in Ethiopia, India, and Vietnam, presence and number of older sisters in the household are associated with a 30-50 percent lower likelihood of teen marriage, while the association is null in Peru. Also, we show that having a girl as next-youngest sibling does not significantly affect girls' likelihood of experiencing teen marriage, except in Ethiopia. Our results combined support theories of family-level resource constraints over sibling rivalry hypotheses. Our findings enrich and complement existing evidence on the role of sibling sex-composition on adolescent outcomes in low-and middle-income countries.

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The Decline of Arranged Marriage? Marital Change and Continuity in India

Cited by 120 publications

References 43 publications

Conflict and Compatibility? Developmental Idealism and Gendered Differences in Marital Choice

Conflict and Compatibility? Developmental Idealism and Gendered Differences in Marital Choice

Marriage Markets in Developing Countries

Household Determinants of Teen Marriage: Sister Effects Across Four Low‐ and Middle‐Income Countries

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