The Defence of East Timor: A Recipe For Disaster?

Ball, Desmond

doi:10.1080/1323910022000023147

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…174 This suggests that East Timor is aware of the security risks it now faces as an independent sovereign state such that it needs to be capable of defending its territory from foreign forces despite the low level of likelihood of external military threats or being invaded by another state. 175 This highlights the ideational motivations underpinning East Timor's pursuit of real independence through military strengthening, even if external threats are improbable. Realistically, East Timor's armed forces could only offer minor resistance in the face of external attack regardless of increased military spending.…”

Section: A New Approach To External Security In East Timormentioning

confidence: 97%

East Timor's Emerging National Security Agenda: Establishing “Real” Independence

Strating¹

2013

Asian Security

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Section: A New Approach To External Security In East Timormentioning

confidence: 97%

East Timor's Emerging National Security Agenda: Establishing “Real” Independence

Strating¹

2013

Asian Security

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“…18 Australia spent Aus$3.9 billion on East Timor from 1999 to 2004. 19 Even prior to the 2005 intervention, one analyst predicted that a minimum of Aus$2 billion would be required through the next decade. 20 Australia seems to be on track to fulfill this prediction, as even this incomplete examination of costs in Table 3 shows.…”

Section: Unexceptional East Timormentioning

confidence: 99%

No News Is Good News

Abdiel

2010

Armed Forces & Society

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The Australian government and military have maintained humanitarian interventions for far longer than any comparable U.S. humanitarian intervention. This longevity confounds most traditional international relations theories. It seems that the key variable is public support for humanitarian interventions. The U.S. public quickly grew impatient with humanitarian operations, while the Australian public has not yet done so. Two reasons for the Australian public’s forbearance are explored. First, the idea that the Australian military and government are proficient at these operations and that the public supports these operations because it “loves a winner” is found wanting. Second, innate differences between the United States and Australia, particularly regarding news media, are explored; these differences seem to be highly correlated with the longevity of the operations. It seems likely that the Australian public does not hear enough about these operations to be concerned about them or question their utility, efficacy, or cost.

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“…The continued presence of "warlords and conflict entrepreneurs," coupled with ongoing militia resistance to U.S. dominance, has impeded relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan, 33 and there is speculation that excombatant banditry is a problem in East Timor. 34 Iraq is already experiencing similar problems with violent crime, small-scale battles and resistance to U.S. forces. 35 The existence of numerous militia groups, large numbers of unemployed former Iraqi soldiers plus the availability of light and heavy weapons makes widespread organized crime and banditry a real risk in Iraq.…”

Section: Building and Sustainingmentioning

confidence: 99%