The Definitive Reform: Why Did Mexico’s PRI Propose and Approve the 1996 Electoral Reform?

Sierra, Sebastián Garrido de

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2151629

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…The Online Appendix also confirms that even in states with a PRD governor, where turnout buying is likely to be most prevalent, there is no evidence that an additional polling station increases PRD turnout 38 . While consistent with the PRD’s campaigning, this finding might be counterintuitive since the PRD is known for endorsing former PRI candidates that bring their political machines with them (Garrido de Sierra 2013a, 2013b, Langston 2012). A possible explanation is that those candidates switching to the PRD were those with the weakest machines.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…A possible explanation is that those candidates switching to the PRD were those with the weakest machines. Garrido de Sierra (2013a) points out that defectors were often disgruntled PRI members who decided to leave the party after not being nominated as candidates, suggesting that they faced worse electoral prospects. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the PRD could be buying turnout in a different way from the one which our empirical design captures.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party’s Capacity to Monitor Brokers

2016

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Despite its prevalence, little is known about when parties buy turnout. We emphasize the problem of parties monitoring local brokers with incentives to shirk. Our model suggests that parties extract greater turnout buying effort from their brokers where they can better monitor broker performance and where favorable voters would not otherwise turn out. Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of polling stations—and thus electoral information about broker performance—in Mexican electoral precincts, we find that greater monitoring capacity increases turnout and votes for the National Action Party (PAN) and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the effect of monitoring capacity on PRI votes varies nonlinearly with the distance of voters to the polling station: it first increases because rural voters—facing larger costs of voting—generally favor the PRI, before declining as the cost of incentivizing brokers increases. This nonlinearity is not present for the PAN, who stand to gain less from mobilizing rural voters.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%