2020
DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2019.1707224
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The Demise of an Agency Director – A Puzzling Saga of Political Control and Professional Autonomy

Abstract: This article aims at addressing the relationship between expertise and politics by examining a reorganization process of Statistics Norway. The puzzle is why a minor reorganization with low political salience, in a consensus-oriented political administrative setting with high level of trust between ministries and agencies, and high autonomy for agencies ended up as a major conflict resulting in the resignation of the agency director. Based on an instrumental, a cultural and a symbolic perspective the article e… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…To begin with, agencification of the public sector did not commence with NPM (see Wettenhall, 2005). There is no doubt, however, that following NPM ascendancy in the early 1980s, agencification increased exponentially as attested by a quick glance at the global public management literature (see Amarouche & Bogaert, 2019; Bezes et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2008; Christensen & Lægreid, 2020; Moynihan, 2006; Pollitt et al., 2001; Verschuere & Vancoppenolle, 2012). While scholars continuously argue about its key contours, in line with agencification literature, here an agency is defined as “an administrative body that is formally and organizationally separated from a ministerial, or cabinet‐level, department [arm's length] and that carries out public tasks at a national level on a permanent basis, is staffed by public servants, is financed mainly by the state budget, and is subject to public legal procedures” (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009, p. 674).…”
Section: Agencies and The Agencification Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…To begin with, agencification of the public sector did not commence with NPM (see Wettenhall, 2005). There is no doubt, however, that following NPM ascendancy in the early 1980s, agencification increased exponentially as attested by a quick glance at the global public management literature (see Amarouche & Bogaert, 2019; Bezes et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2008; Christensen & Lægreid, 2020; Moynihan, 2006; Pollitt et al., 2001; Verschuere & Vancoppenolle, 2012). While scholars continuously argue about its key contours, in line with agencification literature, here an agency is defined as “an administrative body that is formally and organizationally separated from a ministerial, or cabinet‐level, department [arm's length] and that carries out public tasks at a national level on a permanent basis, is staffed by public servants, is financed mainly by the state budget, and is subject to public legal procedures” (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009, p. 674).…”
Section: Agencies and The Agencification Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This stream draws on the broader theoretical perspectives in the field of organizational studies (Asquer, 2012; Brown et al, 2003; Ongaro, 2006). As Waluyo (2022) maintains, the focus is on qualitatively assessing “the actual practices conducted in day‐to‐day life, how ordinary actions are practiced in the agencies, and how practices and procedures are worked out in local agency settings.” Contributions aimed at understanding de facto as opposed to formal autonomy acknowledge the influence of path dependence in shaping agencification (Christensen & Lægreid, 2021; Maggetti & Verhoest, 2014). This means that agencies are the product of a historical trajectory and that they are embedded in structures that were already in place at the time of agencification (Moynihan, 2006).…”
Section: State Of the Art In Agencification Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this regard, scholarship on the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 2013) and/or the logic of consequentiality may provide a lens to discuss how much individuals take actions by matching health crisis situations with their identities and rules prescribing what is appropriate action in a democratic political order rather than alternative logics, such as cost–benefit calculations. For example, the logic of appropriateness and consequentiality have been used to look at government organizational change and reorganization processes (Entwistle2011; Christensen and Lægreid 2021). More in general, thus, although it was outside the scope of our investigation, exploring “under what conditions rules of appropriateness may overpower or redefine self‐interest, or the logic of consequentiality may overpower rules and an entrenched definition of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2013, 492) is a research avenue worth pursuing.…”
Section: Limitations and Future Research Avenuesmentioning
confidence: 99%