The Democratic Dilemmas of Differentiated Integration: The Views of Political Party Actors

Abstract

Differentiated integration (DI) appeals as a pragmatic way of accommodating political and economic differences among member states (MS). However, it potentially challenges their equal standing in EU decision‐making, creating the possibility for some MS to dominate others. As such, it risks undermining the democratic legitimacy of the EU. Drawing on 35 interviews with party actors in seven MS, we find many shared these concerns, thereby questioning the acceptance of DI. While they considered DI could support self‐determination at the national level, they worried it might result in arbitrary exclusion and growing inequality at the EU level. To be non‐dominating, they contended differentiated policies must remain open for all to join, be based on clear criteria, and allow all MS a say, though only participating states should be entitled to vote on differentiated policies in the Council, whereas all MEPs should be able to vote in the European Parliament.

Normative foundations and political party views of differentiated integration

“…Our empirical analysis shows that some party actors also worry about differentiated integration creating domination (Bellamy et al, 2022;Kröger et al, 2021). Whereas most respondents thought differentiated integration does not create domination, several worried that it could become a source of arbitrary exclusion.…”

Differentiation, dominance and democratic congruence: A relational view

“…Hence, such provision at any level may be constrained by different political or normative claims -some cooperative scheme may be subject to higher normative claims for a duty to support them (for outsiders) or a duty to be inclusive (for insiders) than others. Thus common pool resources may encourage free riding and therefore selfexclusion from cooperation schemes but at the same time they may have a higher normative claim for a duty to participate, regardless of DI functional pressures (Bellamy et al, 2021).…”

“…Especially when politicised domestically, such differences may serve as pretexts or reasons for strengthening the grip of populist political parties, making democratic backsliding easier while opting out from the core European club (Bartolini, 2005). The debate is open whether DI facilitates violations around the rule of law, democratic values, and civil and human rights and more generally democratic backsliding, or whether on the contrary it forestalls reactions against integration by forestalling the erosion of MS' national cultures (Bellamy & Kröger, 2021, see also Rawls, 1999. If, in turn, the EU better accommodates cultural diversity, then the cultural dimension might indeed ground an argument in favor of DI.…”

Design principles for efficient and legitimate differentiated integration schemes

“…Individual support is strongly correlated with geographical, ideological, and sociodemographic factors (Leuffen et al 2020;Winzen and Schimmelfennig 2021) and highly context-specific, varying according to the policy area, procedures, and design features of the scheme (de Blok et al 2021). Among political parties, a 2020 small-scale qualitative study finds 40.0 per cent of respondents (net +14.3 per cent) supportive of the principle of DI but concerned about many of its potential consequences (Kröger et al 2021) while a 2019 expert survey manages to identify the position of only 33 parties out of 271, with opinion in favour of existing Eurozone differentiation, against multi-speed differentiation, and spilt toward opt-outs (InDivEU 2021). Among governments, two 2020 expert surveys outline very complex and opaque country positions, which the former interprets as cautious support for flexible cooperation but the latter as a predominant opposition to the principle of DI coupled with reluctant acceptance of specific schemes (Brudzińska 2020;Telle et al 2021).…”