The Dependent Variable of the Domestic-External Conflict Relationship: Anecdotes, Theories and Systematic Studies

Heldt, Birger

doi:10.1177/0022343397034001008

Cited by 13 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…We found only weak support for the idea that countries involved in an international war have a higher probability of civil war ( p ϭ .090 for 1946 -92 was the strongest estimate). This weak result reflects the ambiguous findings of the literature on the internal-external conflict nexus (Heldt 1997;Levy 1989). An international war may be an opportunity for dissenting groups to rebel, but it is also a means for the government to unite the country against an external enemy.…”

Section: The Effect Of the Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 95%

Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992

Hegre

Ellingsen²,

Gates³

et al. 2001

Am Polit Sci Rev

1,222

715

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Coherent democracies and harshly authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate regimes are the most conflict-prone. Domestic violence also seems to be associated with political change, whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy. Is the greater violence of intermediate regimes equivalent to the finding that states in political transition experience more violence? If both level of democracy and political change are relevant, to what extent is civil violence related to each? Based on an analysis of the period 1816–1992, we conclude that intermediate regimes are most prone to civil war, even when they have had time to stabilize from a regime change. In the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the democratization process. The democratic civil peace is not only more just than the autocratic peace but also more stable.

show abstract

Section: The Effect Of the Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 95%

Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992

Hegre

Ellingsen²,

Gates³

et al. 2001

Am Polit Sci Rev

1,222

715

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The theory's applications to international relations are reviewed by Levy (1989) and Heldt (1997). these theorists foresee the broadening of group identities to include a variety of others with whom it is possible to identify and live in peace. Yet social identity theory postulates that this broader identity can only be achieved vis-a-vis some newly defined 'other'.Vn this view, then, the vision of Deutsch and his colleagues of a pluralistic community 'of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we-feeling", trust, and mutual consideration, of identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior' (Adler & Barnett, 1998) implicitly leaves others on the outside.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A more nuanced perspective isStein (1976). The theory's applications to international relations are reviewed byLevy (1989) andHeldt (1997).3 Mercer also gives a good review of this literature. For major constructivist applications, seeOnuf (1989) andWendt (1999).4 Also considerDoyle (1986: 116): 'Fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; non-liberals suffer from a presumption of enmity.'…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence

Russett

Oneal

Cox

2000

Journal of Peace Research

204

161

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We assess the degree to which propositions from Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order can account for the incidence of militarized interstate disputes between countries during the period 1950-92. We find that such traditional realist influences as contiguity, alliances, and relative power, and liberal influences of joint democracy and interdependence, provide a much better account of interstate conflict. Pairs of states split across civilizational boundaries are no more likely to become engaged in disputes than are other states ceteris paribus. Even disputes between the West and the rest of the world, or with Islam, were no more common than those between or within most other groups. Among Huntington's eight civilizations, interstate conflict was significantly less likely only within the West; dyads in other civilizations were as likely to fight as were states split across civilizations, when realist and liberal influences are held constant. The dominance of a civilization by a core state, democratic or not, does little to inhibit violence within the civilization. Contrary to the thesis that the clash of civilizations will replace Cold War rivalries as the greatest source of conflict, militarized interstate disputes across civilizational boundaries became less common, not more so, as the Cold War waned. Nor do civilizations appear to have an important indirect influence on interstate conflict through the realist or liberal variables. They help to predict alliance patterns but make little contribution to explaining political institutions or commercial interactions. We can be grateful that Huntington challenged us to consider the role that civilizations might play in international relations, but there is little evidence that they define the fault lines along which international conflict is apt to occur.

show abstract

“…This information is then included in a decision-making framework by the constituency and added to a previous evaluation of the government's performance. The initiation of a conflict is thus an attempt by the leadership to improve its chances of remaining in office (Downs and Rocke 1995;Heldt 1997Heldt , 1999Richards et al 1993).…”

Section: Diversionary Conflict As a Principal Agent Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts

Davies

2002

Journal of Conflict Resolution

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The effects of domestic strife on the likelihood of an international conflict are tested empirically. A rareevents logit model with corrections for temporal dependence to assess whether domestic strife is related to the initiation of international conflicts is used to test the validity of the diversionary conflict thesis. Results suggest that decision makers do initiate international conflicts when the state is undergoing domestic strife, although not in a predicted manner. The results indicate that violent domestic strife increases the likelihood of a diversionary conflict, whereas nonviolent strife increases the likelihood of repression. The research also presents evidence that calls into question some of the claims made in previous studies and demonstrates that domestic strife in a target state increases the likelihood of being attacked.Itisgenerallybelievedthatdomesticproblemsthatthreatenthesurvivalofadecision maker can influence the conflict behavior of a state. Although qualitative researchers are convinced of a relationship between domestic strife and international conflict, quantitative analysts have found very little evidence to support such a belief. Using a directed dyad data set that contains a variety of control variables, I evaluate the affect of domestic dissatisfaction on the probability of a decision maker's initiating an international conflict. PREVIOUS RESEARCHDomestic dissatisfaction is believed to affect the likelihood of an international conflict in three ways. First, it is expected to increase the probability of external aggression. Internal difficulties are externalized to divert attention away from domestic problems (Levy 1989). The decision maker believes that an international conflict will generate a "rally round the flag" effect (Mueller 1973). The domestic constituency will

show abstract

The Dependent Variable of the Domestic-External Conflict Relationship: Anecdotes, Theories and Systematic Studies

Cited by 13 publications

References 20 publications

Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992

Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992

Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence

Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About