The description-experience gap: a challenge for the neuroeconomics of decision-making under uncertainty

Abstract

The experimental investigation of decision-making in humans relies on two distinct types of paradigms, involving either description- or experience-based choices. In description-based paradigms decision variables (i.e., payoffs and probabilities) are explicitly communicated by mean of symbols. In experience-based paradigms decision variables are learnt from trial-by-trial feedback. In the decision-making literature ‘description-experience gap’ refers to the fact that different biases are observed in the two experimental paradigms. Remarkably, well-documented biases of description-based choices, such as under-weighting of rare events and loss aversion, do not apply to experience-based decisions. Here we argue that the description-experience gap represents a major challenge, not only to current decision theories, but also to the neuroeconomics research framework, which reliesheavily on the translation of neurophysiological findings between human and non-human primate research. In fact, most non-human primate neurophysiological research relies on behavioural designs that share features of both description and experience-based choices. As a consequence, it is unclear whether the neural mechanisms discovered in non-human primate electrophysiology should be linked to description-based or experience-based decision-making processes. The picture is further complicated by additional methodological gaps between human and non-human primate neural research. After analysing these methodological challenges, we conclude proposing new lines of research to address them.

Reduced risk-seeking in chimpanzees in a zero-outcome game

“…One of the key factors that influences how people make risky choices is how the information about the options is obtained [ 34 , 42 ]. For example, humans are typically risk averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses when asked in terms of explicitly described odds and outcomes, but this pattern can reverse when learning from experience [ 43 – 45 ]. Although humans may be used to processing hypothetical and described information in the modern world, we also often fall back to more automatic and evolutionary ancient decision-making processes [ 46 ], which might be better captured when learning about risk by experience.…”

Impact of internal and external factors on prosocial choices in rhesus macaques

“…For instance, Tonkean macaques have better performance at pointing out a baited location to an experimenter than rhesus, barbary or long-tailed macaques [ 57 ]. Finally, as shown in neuroeconomic studies in humans, providing instructions to subjects or making them learn more about the nature of decision variables may result in different choice biases [ 70 ]. A similar phenomenon might apply to social decisions.…”

A Behavioral Association Between Prediction Errors and Risk-Seeking: Theory and Evidence

“…This phenomenon has been termed the description-experience gap and is considered a “major challenge” for neuroeconomics (Garcia, Cerrotti et al 2021). In cognitive neuroscience and psychology, some studies have reproduced this phenomenon (Madan, Ludvig et al 2014), while others report risk aversion in the gain domain (Niv, Edlund et al 2012).…”