2021
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.06.025
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The design and transmission of central bank liquidity provisions

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Cited by 64 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…Moreover, banks are often not rewarded for a balanced sovereign portfolio as rating agencies tend not to rate them above their sovereign in any case (Bilbiie et al, 2020). Several papers have also shown that particular monetary policy interventions might incentivize banks in some euro area countries to hold more domestic public debt (for example Acharya and Steffen, 2015;Carpinelli and Crosignani, forthcoming;Hristov et al, forthcoming), e.g. by reinforcing the tendency towards gambling for resurrection (Drechsler et al, 2016).…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, banks are often not rewarded for a balanced sovereign portfolio as rating agencies tend not to rate them above their sovereign in any case (Bilbiie et al, 2020). Several papers have also shown that particular monetary policy interventions might incentivize banks in some euro area countries to hold more domestic public debt (for example Acharya and Steffen, 2015;Carpinelli and Crosignani, forthcoming;Hristov et al, forthcoming), e.g. by reinforcing the tendency towards gambling for resurrection (Drechsler et al, 2016).…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, it connects to the growing literature on the European sovereign debt crisis. Recent work investigates the real effects of unconventional monetary policy by the ECB (e.g., Daetz et al., 2016; Acharya et al., 2019, 2020; Carpinelli & Crosignani, 2020), and the effects of these policies on sovereign risk (e.g., Eser & Schwaab, 2013; Szczerbowicz, 2015; Krishnamurthy et al., 2018). In particular, our fire‐sale risk channel is related to the residual component of sovereign bond yields not explained by sovereign default risk or redenomination risk, and referred to as a domestic segmentation channel in Krishnamurthy et al.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…If no frictions exist, the maturity in refinancing operations plays no role as banks can rollover short-term loans further. However, the maturity becomes important when uncertainty about the future central bank accommodation emerges, the issue referred to as the maturity extension channel (Carpinelli and Crosignani, 2021). That is, the banks could be exposed to rollover risk in the face of possible tightening of the short-term liquidity channel, leading to lower credit supply.…”
Section: Longer-term Refinancing Operationsmentioning
confidence: 99%