The desire for impact

Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2007.10.006

Cited by 24 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Our approach is closely related to this research. Moreover, the ideas put forward in the present paper have much in common with an interesting recent strand of literature on public service motivation (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008;Francois, 2000Francois, , 2007Dur and Glazer, 2008;Prendergast, 2007;Besley and Ghatak, 2005;Heyes, 2004;Frank, 2003;Handy and Katz, 1998). A typical finding in the latter literature is that while the public sector (or an employer with a specific mission) may be attractive to highly motivated employees, a high wage will also attract "the wrong types" (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008;Francois, 2007;Prendergast, 2007;Heyes, 2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 62%

“…11 The subtraction of W bm −i in (7) does not affect behavior. 12 Dur and Glazer (2008) propose that workers have a preference to "make an impact", and assume that "a person measures his impact of any action he may take by comparing output in the current period to what it would have been had he unexpectedly ceased to exist an instant before" (p. 4). Their specification is different from ours in several important ways, and consequently yield quite different results.…”

Section: Choosing Effort Levelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One such concern might be to think of oneself as important in a different sense, namely as unique, or irreplacable: "If I did not exist, the world would be a different place". The latter is essentially the approach taken by Dur and Glazer (2008). Our guess would be that most people do care, to some extent, about both aspects of "being important"; however, formalizing both simultaneously would result in an exceedingly complex model, and since most of us are hardly irreplacable at work, while intrinsic work motivation still seem rather common, we have chosen to focus on the first of the two.…”

Section: Proof See Appendix Amentioning

confidence: 99%

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Selfish bakers, caring nurses? A model of work motivation

Brekke

Nyborg

2010

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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JEL classification: D11 D24 D64 H41 J28 Keywords: Self-image Shirking Altruism Work versus welfare Voluntary effort provision a b s t r a c t Work contributes to people's self-image in important ways. We propose a model in which effort is unobservable and where individuals have a preference for being important to others. This gives the following predictions: (1) if a worker's effort is paid by his marginal productivity (bakers), effort is just like in the standard model. (2) If a worker's wage is unaffected by his effort (nurses), more effort is provided than in the standard model. (3) To prevent that shirkers become nurses, nurses' wages must be kept strictly lower than bakers' income. At this wage level there will be too few nurses. (4) Overinvestment in nursing equipment can be justified as a means to attract motivated nurses. (5) Even with full income compensation, both nurses and bakers may experience a net utility loss when losing their job. (6) Similarly, both nurses and bakers may prefer work to welfare, even with full income compensation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 62%

Section: Choosing Effort Levelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Proof See Appendix Amentioning

confidence: 99%

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Selfish bakers, caring nurses? A model of work motivation

Brekke

Nyborg

2010

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…Accordingly, for example, optimal challenges, effectance promoting feedback, and freedom from demeaning evaluations are all predicted to facilitate intrinsic motivation" (Ryan and Deci, 2000). 73 See, e.g., Benz and Frey's (2008) research on the value of independence and Dur and Glazer's (2008a) work on the desire by workers for impact.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets

Rebitzer

Taylor

2010

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in ABSTRACTEmployers structure pay and employment relationships to mitigate agency problems. A large literature in economics documents how the resolution of these problems shapes personnel policies and labor markets. For the most part, the study of agency in employment relationships relies on highly stylized assumptions regarding human motivation, e.g., that employees seek to earn as much money as possible with minimal effort. In this essay, we explore the consequences of introducing behavioral complexity and realism into models of agency within organizations. Specifically, we assess the insights gained by allowing employees to be guided by such motivations as the desire to compare favorably to others, the aspiration to contribute to intrinsically worthwhile goals, and the inclination to reciprocate generosity or exact retribution for perceived wrongs.More provocatively, from the standpoint of standard economics, we also consider the possibility that people are driven, in ways that may be opaque even to themselves, by the desire to earn social esteem or to shape and reinforce identity.

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“…While the former innovation is a unique feature of our analysis, 1 there are by now many other economic studies allowing workers to care about more than just money and effort, see e.g. Francois (2000Francois ( , 2007, Benabou Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), and Dur and Glazer (2008).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace

Dur

Non

Roelfsema

2010

Journal of Economic Psychology

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We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We test these predictions using German Socio-Economic Panel data. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.

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The desire for impact

Cited by 24 publications

References 45 publications

Selfish bakers, caring nurses? A model of work motivation

Selfish bakers, caring nurses? A model of work motivation

Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets

Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace

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