The Determinants of Judiciary Independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court (1956–2002)

Abstract

This paper tests the explanatory power of alternative theories on the determinants of judiciary independence using annual and decision-based data on the Italian Constitutional Court. The estimates show that structural measures of judiciary independence, such as the share of constitutional judges elected by the ranks of the professional judiciary and the age of justices, are positively correlated with independent behavior of the Court. Contrary to previous studies on a similar sample, we find that the Court counteracts the greater cohesion of the other government branches with more independent behavior, improving the effectiveness of the system of checks and balances.

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