2018
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12244
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The determinants of product lines

Abstract: We study product line choice allowing for cost asymmetries but ruling out strategic motivations such as a desire to soften competition. We identify two forces that interact with asymmetric competition to shape equilibrium product lines. Possible outcomes range from head‐to‐head competition to complete separation of product lines and include the intermediate case of partial separation. In an international trade context, we predict which qualities a disadvantaged foreign producer will specialize in. If cost fact… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Insert Figure 3 here with the caption below As is well known, while the EU has passed a rather restrictive regulation policy on rms data pertaining to consumers, in the USA, there is no equivalent federal law and experts seem to agree that, if a similar law is to be passed, it will certainly have to be much more lenient than the European one. 25 Apart from the well known philosophical di¤erences between the two political landscapes, our model o¤ers an economic rationale behind these diverging legislations. Namely, as online industries and tech-companies (such the GAFA), are much more often US-based than European-based, it is natural that, on matters relating to customers information, the EU cares more about consumers interests while the US politicians care more about rms interests.…”
Section: Prots Consumer Surplus and Welfare: Equilibrium Comparisonsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Insert Figure 3 here with the caption below As is well known, while the EU has passed a rather restrictive regulation policy on rms data pertaining to consumers, in the USA, there is no equivalent federal law and experts seem to agree that, if a similar law is to be passed, it will certainly have to be much more lenient than the European one. 25 Apart from the well known philosophical di¤erences between the two political landscapes, our model o¤ers an economic rationale behind these diverging legislations. Namely, as online industries and tech-companies (such the GAFA), are much more often US-based than European-based, it is natural that, on matters relating to customers information, the EU cares more about consumers interests while the US politicians care more about rms interests.…”
Section: Prots Consumer Surplus and Welfare: Equilibrium Comparisonsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For the moment, let us temporarily adopt the usual denition of welfare, namely, the sum of the discounted streams of consumers surplus and prot. We can then express welfare as a function of with ( ) being equal to: 25 A U.S. law wouldnt simply copy the GDPR, according to Eduardo Ustaran, codirector of the privacy practice at law rm Hogan Lovells. Privacy and data protection are fundamental rights from the EU perspective but not in the U.S., he says.…”
Section: Prots Consumer Surplus and Welfare: Equilibrium Comparisonsmentioning
confidence: 99%