2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.020
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The Determinants of Social Conflict in the Latin American Mining Sector: New Evidence with Quantitative Data

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
70
0
12

Year Published

2016
2016
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
5
4

Relationship

2
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 146 publications
(84 citation statements)
references
References 39 publications
2
70
0
12
Order By: Relevance
“…In Peru, mining companies tax about 40% of all their utilities. In spite of this, poor institutionality causes distribution problems, which remains one of the fundamental causes of conflicts between mines and communities [27]. For this reason, it is important to identify the economic activities of the place in order to promote it and make them grow with the help of the state.…”
Section: Economy (V9)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Peru, mining companies tax about 40% of all their utilities. In spite of this, poor institutionality causes distribution problems, which remains one of the fundamental causes of conflicts between mines and communities [27]. For this reason, it is important to identify the economic activities of the place in order to promote it and make them grow with the help of the state.…”
Section: Economy (V9)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In that contemporary classic, the divergent economic development of two otherwise "identical" cross-border towns, Nogales (Sonora, Mexico), and Nogales (Arizona, USA) is explained by the principal substantive difference between them -the historical development of political institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, 7). Although we must recognize the specificity of any given case, when looking at the two sides of Pascua Lama project, it is apparent that many of the principal variables considered to be determinants of activist mobilization (Bebbington & Bury, 2013;Haslam & Ary Tanimoune, 2016;Conde & LeBillon, 2017) and policy influence (Tosun & Workman, 2018;Baumgartner et al, 2018, 62), are broadly similar, while the variable of interest, institutional quality, varies significantly. I comment on each of these variables in turn: o Firm and project.…”
Section: Pascua Lama: a Flawed Project And Perfect Comparative Casementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The political settlement in mining was grounded in federal recognition of provincial claims to autonomous development and regulation of the sector, following constitutional reform in 1994. Elite consensus on the desirability of mining was strong in provinces like San Juan under governor José Luis Gioja (2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015), where mining was seen as an important source of provincial revenue and employment in jurisdictions that were historically rentiers dependent on transfers from the federal government (Gervasoni, 2010, 306;Haslam, 2016Haslam, , 2018.…”
Section: Pascua Lama: a Flawed Project And Perfect Comparative Casementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In order to understand the long‐term political impact of the resource curse it is also necessary to explain the discontinuities that can occur in the appropriation and use of rents associated with natural resource abundance. There has been some discussion in the literature on the possibility of ‘overcoming’ or ‘turning back’ the curse, as both case studies and econometric work have demonstrated that the resource curse is not an iron law, but instead conditional on a whole range of factors — particularly institutional quality and human capital formation (Boschini et al., : 19; Collier and Hoeffler, : 630; Haber and Menaldo, : 2; Haslam and Ary Tanimoune, ; Kurtz and Brooks, : 752; Mehlum et al., : 1127). However, most analyses underline the historical and path‐dependent processes of state formation that culminated in a state apparatus capable of regulating natural resources in the public interest in some countries, but not in others (Crabtree and Crabtree‐Condor, ; Kurtz, : 480–1).…”
Section: Rents and The Resource Cursementioning
confidence: 99%