The deterministic protocol for rational secret sharing

Maleka, Shaik; Shareef, Amjed; Rangan, C. Pandu

doi:10.1109/ipdps.2008.4536558

Cited by 15 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Other schemes relying on simultaneous channel (Maleka et al 2008b;Abraham et al 2006;Cai and Peng 2012;Zhang and Cai 2012;Gordon and Katz 2006;Maleka et al 2008a;Luo et al 2012;Zhang and Liu 2013;Zhang and Cai 2010;Isshiki et al 2010). In traditional SMPC, semi-honest behaviors can be converted into malicious behaviors using tools such as zero knowledge and bit commitment.…”

Section: Classical Schemes 31 Rational Secret Sharing Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A brief survey on secure multi-party computing in the presence of rational parties

Wang

Qin

et al. 2015

J Ambient Intell Human Comput

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Intelligent agents (IA) are autonomous entities which observe through sensors and act upon an environment using actuators to adjust their activities towards achieving certain goals. The architectures of agents have enormous potentials when they are applied into critical systems, where agents choose actions between working with their own and cooperating with others. Rational utility-based agents choose actions to maximize their expected utilities. Rational secure multi-party computing (RSMPC) means secure multi-party computing (SMPC) in the presence of rational utility-based agents. Here, we call them rational parties. In this paper certain goals of rational parties are maximizing their utilities. The introduction of rational parties considers the incentives in executing protocols. The security definitions under rational framework can better demonstrate the executing environment of real protocols. Furthermore, rational two-party computing removes some impossibility in traditional two-party computing, such as fairness. This paper represents the research status of RSMPC and some typical protocols. The advantages and disadvantages of previous rational SMPC protocols are discussed here. As an emerging field, there are still lots of open problems in RSMPC, such as communication channels, utility assumptions and equilibrium notions etc.

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Section: Classical Schemes 31 Rational Secret Sharing Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A brief survey on secure multi-party computing in the presence of rational parties

Wang

Qin

et al. 2015

J Ambient Intell Human Comput

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“…In this section, we propose a practical rational secret sharing based IBE public key algorithm and Maleka's scheme in [6].…”

Section: The Ibe Based Rational Secret Sharing Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…et.al. [6] found out that a rational player may be deterred from exploiting his short term advantage by the threat of punishment that reduces his long term payoff. Under this assumption, they proposed a scheme, in which players interact repeatedly in several rounds which enables the possibility of secret sharing among rational players.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Identity-Based Rational Secret Sharing Scheme

Yang

2010

2010 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government

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Rational player's behavior in secret sharing schemes always determined by their expect payoff. Under this scenario, rational players will simply not broadcast their shares so that traditional secret sharing schemes could not complete in a bounded running time. In this paper, we propose a new rational secret sharing scheme based on IBE decryption. In this scheme, shares are distributed by dealer encoded by a bilinear pairing in finite field. Rational players exchange their shares in finite repeat games. The mechanism of the scheme makes all the rational players have incentive to broadcast his or her share of the secret. The security analysis and complexity analysis are addressed in the end of the paper.

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“…Several protocols have been devised to solve this problem [5,4,1,10,9,8,7,6,11,13,2,3], but only a handful have actually dealt with rational secret sharing using an asynchronous broadcast channel. These include Maleka et al's result [10] and Fuchsbauer et al's result [3], and Ong et al's result [13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rational Secret Sharing with Honest Players over an Asynchronous Channel

Moses

Rangan

2011

Advances in Network Security and Applications

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We consider the problem of rational secret sharing introduced by Halpern and Teague [5], where the players involved in secret sharing play only if it is to their advantage. This can be characterized in the form of preferences. Players would prefer to get the secret than to not get it and secondly with lesser preference, they would like as few other players to get the secret as possible. Several positive results have already been published to efficiently solve the problem of rational secret sharing. However, only a handful of papers have touched upon the use of an asynchronous broadcast channel, and in those papers, either the protocol involved cryptographic primitives [3] or else the protocol required the dealer to be interactively involved [10]. However, [13] did handle such a case through the use of an honest minority of players, but in their paper, they had placed a restriction on the number of honest players that could take part in relation to the total number number of players active in the protocol.In our paper, we propose an m-out-of-n rational secret sharing scheme which can function over an asynchronous broadcast channel without the use of cryptographic primitives and with a non-interactive dealer. This is possible because our scheme uses a small number, k + 1, of honest players. The protocol is resilient to coalitions of size up to k and furthermore it is ε-resilient to coalitions of size up to m − 1. The protocol will have a strict Nash equilibrium with probability P r( k+1 n ) and an ε-Nash equilibrium with probability P r( n−k−1 n ). Furthermore, our protocol is immune to backward induction.Later on in the paper, we extend our results to include malicious players as well. We also show that our protocol handles the possibility of a player deviating in order to force another player to get a wrong value. This type of deviation was discussed and handled by Asharov and Lindell [2] by increasing the number of rounds. However, our protocol handles this in what we believe to be a more time efficient manner.

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The deterministic protocol for rational secret sharing

Cited by 15 publications

References 6 publications

A brief survey on secure multi-party computing in the presence of rational parties

A brief survey on secure multi-party computing in the presence of rational parties

An Identity-Based Rational Secret Sharing Scheme

Rational Secret Sharing with Honest Players over an Asynchronous Channel

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