The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence: Explaining British Policy in 1914

Abstract

This essay explores the deterrence‐versus‐restraint dilemma in extended deterrence in the context of the Tripartite Crisis Game under incomplete information. This model was developed specifically to capture the mixed motives and contradictory impulses that oftentimes frame extended deterrence encounters. To focus the analysis and to gain tractability, we make specific assumptions about the utilities of the players: Challenger, Defender, and Protégé. Our most significant simplification concerns Defender's type. In particular, we assume that Defender, although not heavily invested in the issues in dispute, is known to prefer conflict to the breakup of its strategic relationship with Protégé. One important result concerns unequivocal commitments. We find that such commitments are efficacious but only when Protégé's threat to sever its relationship with Defender is highly credible. In the absence of this condition, a straddle (or mixed) strategy is optimal for Defender. A straddle strategy, which involves probabilistic support of Protégé, is the mechanism by which Defender attempts to resolve the deterrence‐versus‐restraint dilemma. Sometimes, the stratagem works and Challenger is deterred and Protégé is restrained. But a straddle strategy will always fail to deter determined Challengers, such as Germany in 1914, that prefer to fight rather than back down during a confrontation. It may even fail to deter hesitant Challengers with an aversion to conflict. We use these insights to explain and evaluate British policy in the runup to World War I.

Explaining the 1914 War in Europe

“…In what follows, I expressly do not attempt to offer an explanation of Britain's entry into the war and its failure to deter a German attack on Belgium and France. As explained in Section 5, this question, which is addressed elsewhere (Zagare and Kilgour, 2006), is largely immaterial to my immediate purpose of constructing an explanation of Even so, as late as 27 July, no irrevocable choices had been made by any European government. True, Austria-Hungary and Germany had decided on a joint course of action, and Austria had issued a demanding ultimatum, but no significant military steps had actually been taken.…”

Domestic uncertainty, third-party resolve, and international conflict

“…Reed (2003) uses variance in the distribution of player types to model increasing uncertainty.3 Great powers' interests may also be relevant regardless of their prior involvement with the states in question. Here we consider just one type of potential intervener, but one that should comprise the greatest number of potentially interested parties.4 Probabilistic commitments may restrain an ally while simultaneously deterring an opponent(Zagare & Kilgour, 2006;Benson, 2012). In such cases all parties are equally aware of the likelihood of intervention.…”

“… 4 Probabilistic commitments may restrain an ally while simultaneously deterring an opponent (Zagare & Kilgour, 2006; Benson, 2012). In such cases all parties are equally aware of the likelihood of intervention.…”

Western Theory of International Military Alliances

“…Глен Снайдер отмечал, что опасения относительно воз-можного вовлечения в нежелательные кон-фликты побуждает государства дистанци-роваться от партнёров по альянсу [Snyder 1997]. В то же время в условиях «двойного сдерживания» подобное поведение снижа-ет полезность альянса в противодействии внешней угрозе [Zagare, Kilgour 2006].…”