The Development of Anthropomorphism in Interaction: Intersubjectivity, Imagination, and Theory of Mind

Abstract

Human beings frequently attribute anthropomorphic features, motivations and behaviors to animals, artifacts, and natural phenomena. Historically, many interpretations of this attitude have been provided within different disciplines. What most interpretations have in common is distinguishing children’s manifestations of this attitude, which are considered “natural,” from adults’ occurrences, which must be explained by resorting to particular circumstances. In this article, I argue that anthropomorphism is not grounded in specific belief systems but rather in interaction. In interaction, a non-human entity assumes a place that generally is attributed to a human interlocutor, which means that it is independent of the beliefs that people may have about the nature and features of the entities that are anthropomorphized. This perspective allows us to explain the problems that emerge if we consider anthropomorphism as a belief: (i) adults under certain circumstances may anthropomorphize entities even if they perfectly know that these entities have no mental life; (ii) according to the situation, the same entity may be anthropomorphized or treated as an object; (iii) there is no consistency among the entities that are anthropomorphized; (iv) there is individual variability in anthropomorphization, and this variability derives from affective states rather than from different degrees of knowledge about the entity that is anthropomorphized or greater or lesser naivety of the person who anthropomorphizes. From this perspective, anthropomorphism is a basic human attitude that begins in infants and persists throughout life. The difference between adults and children is not qualitative but rather a matter of complexity.

She talks to me as if she were alive

“…A broad sample of effects has already been observed: a growing tendency to anthropomorphize is associated with a higher perceived credibility of a computer [17], and it predicts user satisfaction in the context of voice assistants [24]. The tendency to anthropomorphize inanimate objects can be especially observed in children [1,27]. Taking a look at their early development, it can be observed that children begin to show tendencies to personify their toys at a young age, which intensifies through emotional attachments [14].…”

“…Between the ages of three and five, a child gains the ability to perceive the emotional and mental states in others, which is commonly known as the theory of mind [28]. As the child gets older, the tendency to anthropomorphize diminishes [1,17]. Airenti [1] argues that on growing older, children develop the ability of more complex reflection processes.…”

“…As the child gets older, the tendency to anthropomorphize diminishes [1,17]. Airenti [1] argues that on growing older, children develop the ability of more complex reflection processes. Considering this impact of age, it is reasonable to assume that specifically younger children need to be considered as a group that will be more prone to anthropomorphize modern technology.…”

“…Apart from the duration of interaction, one factor that has emerged as related to the tendency to anthropomorphize is age. Based on findings from Airenti [1], a negative effect on the anthropomorphization-tendency is hypothesized: Hypothesis 2 (H2): Age predicts the tendency to anthropomorphize the voice assistant. With regard to social reactions, empirical evidence has not yet been accumulated as to whether there is a development in showing such reactions toward voice assistants over time.…”

“…This is further emphasized by a contradictory phenomenon -people tend to characterize such social reactions to machines as inappropriate [21], which stands in visible contrast to their actual behavior. While there are numerous studies on the conditions and extent of these reactions among adults, children have been largely neglected in this area of research -even though their well-documented enhanced tendency to anthropomorphize inanimate objects [1] makes them a special and vulnerable group. That is because a higher tendency to mindfully treat artificial entities as humans (through the explicit attribution of human characteristics) suggests an upward tendency to do the same on an unconscious level, in the form of the display of social reactions.…”