The Development of Principal–agent, Contracting and Accountability Relationships in the Public Sector: Conceptual and Cultural Problems

The donor–beneficiary charity accountability paradox: a tale of two stakeholders

“…The specific natures of instrumental and normative accountability mean that they may be discharged in different ways, depending on those involved. For example, although reports may be contractually required by 'upward' stakeholders (for example, grantmaking organizations), and feature prominently in the discharge of such accountability, normative accountability is more likely to be provided 'downward' (for example, to beneficiaries) in different forms (Broadbent et al, 1996). While formal reports (of perhaps a less technical nature than those required for 'upward' accountability) and other communications may play a part in 'downward' accountability, features beyond merely providing information will possibly be most relevant (such as the quality and immediacy of service delivery, and 'voice' in terms of decision making).…”

Public accountability: reforms and resistance in social housing

“…It is elusive, chameleon-like and everexpanding (Dubnick 2002;Sinclair 1995;Mulgan 2000). Accountability is mobilized to justify public services reforms (Broadbent, Dietrich, and Laughlin 1996;Dubnick 2002); yet, it is notoriously difficult to define, with synonyms (e.g. transparency and answerability 3 ) regularly used in its place (Ferry, Eckersley, and Zakaria 2015;Smyth 2012).…”

Assessing Open Government Performance through Three Public Administration Perspectives: Efficiency, Democratic Responsiveness, and Legal-rational Process

“…The complexity is not limited to the second part; transparency in the earlier stages can sometimes be damaging to efficiency and effectiveness because transparency requires extra resources to meet the aims of public openness during the process (Heald, 2006 impacting open government performance measurement as a result of governance complexity is the problem of politics. Accountability in performance is aided by principal-agent structures that include rules and policies of processes and outcomes into contracts, and use of trust-based, relational contracting (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994;Broadbent, Dietrich, and Laughlin, 1996;Terry, 1998). But these same principals in open government programs are political leaders with their own interests in adhering to the wishes of political party or their public constituency (Dubnick and Frederickson, 2010).…”