The Development of Public Support for Parliament in Germany, 1951–59

Boynton, G. R.; Loewenberg, Gerhard

doi:10.1017/s0007123400007778

Cited by 64 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…22 That research treats institutional loyalty as opposition to fundamental structural and functional changes in the institution; 23 and it is grounded empirically in the history of attacks by politicians against courts in the United States (for example, court-packing) 24 and elsewhere (for example, manipulation of appellate jurisdiction). 22 That research treats institutional loyalty as opposition to fundamental structural and functional changes in the institution; 23 and it is grounded empirically in the history of attacks by politicians against courts in the United States (for example, court-packing) 24 and elsewhere (for example, manipulation of appellate jurisdiction).…”

Section: N S T I T U T I O N a L L O Y A L T Y I N T H E A F T E R mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?

Gibson

Caldeira

Spence

2003

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

207

130

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The conventional wisdom about the US Supreme Court and the 2000 presidential election is that the Court wounded itself by participating in such a partisan dispute. By ‘wounded’ people mean that the institution lost some of its legitimacy. Evidence from our survey, conducted in early 2001, suggests little if any diminution of the Court’s legitimacy in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore, even among African Americans. We observe a relationship between evaluations of the opinion and institutional legitimacy, but the bulk of the causality seems to flow from loyalty to evaluations of the case, not vice versa. We argue that legitimacy frames perceptions of the Court opinion. Furthermore, increased awareness of the activities of the Court tends to reinforce legitimacy by exposing people to the powerful symbols of law. In 2000, legitimacy did indeed seem to provide a reservoir of good will that allowed the Court to weather the storm created by its involvement in Florida’s presidential election.

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Section: N S T I T U T I O N a L L O Y A L T Y I N T H E A F T E R mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?

Gibson

Caldeira

Spence

2003

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

207

130

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“…reports the responses of the South Africans to these queries. The first statements pro‐pose making fundamental structural changes to the institution (see Boynton and Loewenberg 1973); the last proposition is a generalized measure of trust that the institution will perform acceptably in the future. To the extent that South Africans support fundamental structural changes in the Court and distrust it, they are extending little legitimacy to the institution.…”

Section: The Institutional Legitimacy Of the Constitutional Courtmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy, Popular Acceptance, and the South African Constitutional Court

Gibson

Caldeira²

2003

The Journal of Politics

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The question of how courts in newly emerging democracies are able to act in a "countermajoritarian" fashion is of burning theoretical and practical importance. Consequently, we investigate the relationship between the legitimacy of the South African Constitutional Court and its success at generating acquiescence to its decisions even when they are unpopular. Based on a national survey, we begin by describing the institutional loyalty the Court enjoys among its constituents. We next consider the consequences of legitimacy by determining whether people are willing to acquiesce to an adverse Court decision on a civil liberties dispute. Our central hypothesis-that legitimate institutions are capable of generating acceptance of decisions, even when citizens find the policy highly disagreeable-receives only conditional support. What little legitimacy the Constitutional Court has acquired does not readily translate into acquiescence to its decisions. The apparent inability of the Court to perform the role of a "veto player" in South African politics has important consequences for that country's efforts to consolidate its democratic transition.Those responsible for the "Third Wave" of democratization place an extraordinary degree of confidence in judicial institutions as guardians of democracy. Courts are often cast as "veto-players" (see, e.g., Alivizatos 1995)-institutions designed to protect democracy from the excesses of executive power, majority

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“…We have learned a little about support for Congress and a lot about support for the Iowa legislature, an imbalance that results from the geographic location of those undertaking the studies (Parker, 1975;Patterson, Hedlund, and Boynton, 1975). Comparable studies appear to be lacking in most other Western countries (see, however, Boynton and Loewenberg, 1973).…”

Section: The Legislature and The Political Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative Studies in Western Democracies: A Comparative Perspective

Jewell¹

1978

Legislative Studies Quarterly

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The Development of Public Support for Parliament in Germany, 1951–59

Cited by 64 publications

References 1 publication

The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?

The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?

Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy, Popular Acceptance, and the South African Constitutional Court

Legislative Studies in Western Democracies: A Comparative Perspective

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