The dictator effect: how long years in office affect economic development

Abstract

This paper contributes to the growing literature on the links between political regimes and economic development by studying the effects of years in office on economic development. The hypothesis is that dictators who stay in office for a long time period will find it increasingly difficult to carry out sound economic policies. We argue that such economic policies are the result of information asymmetries inherent to dictatorships (known as the ‘dictator dilemma’) and of changes in the personality of dictators (known as the ‘winner effect’). We call the combination of these two terms the ‘dictator effect’. We present evidence to suggest that long years in office impacts on economic growth (which is reduced), inflation (which increases) and the quality of institutions (which deteriorates). The negative effect of long years of tenure (i.e. the ‘dictator effect’) is particularly strong in young states and in Africa and the Near East.

Resources and Governance in Sierra Leone’s Civil War

“…On the one hand, resource rents constitute a 'prize' that rebels might want to grab, and facilitate or finance on-going rebellions. But resource rents also enable incumbent governments to suppress the opposition (see also Humphreys, 2005;Papaioannou & van Zanden 2015, Ross, 2004. The opportunity costs of rebelling also feature prominently in such an economic framework, linking the incidence of violence to public goods provision (and allocative decisions by, as well as capacity of, the statesee Basedau & Lay, 2009).…”

Resources and Governance in Sierra Leone’s Civil War

“…On the one hand, resource rents constitute a 'prize' that rebels might want to grab, and facilitate or finance on-going rebellions. But resource rents also enable incumbent governments to suppress the opposition (see also Humphreys, 2005;Papaioannou & van Zanden 2015, Ross, 2004. The opportunity costs of rebelling also feature prominently in such an economic framework, linking the incidence of violence to public goods provision (and allocative decisions by, as well as capacity of, the state -see Basedau & Lay, 2009).…”

Policy Diffusion: A Regime‐sensitive Conceptual Framework

“…Therefore, in this case both the bureaucratic and the civil society routes can be ruled out. Personalist regimes are also characterized by higher economic volatility and lower levels of foreign investment inflow (Knutsen and Fjelde, ; Papaioannou and Van Zanden, ). In contrast, the international route could be feasible for stimulating interdependent policy making since personalist rulers depend on financial assistance from international actors and they are the most sensitive to the loss of external revenue to fuel their patronage networks (Week, , p. 336).…”