The Dictator's Power‐Sharing Dilemma: Countering Dual Outsider Threats

Abstract

Dictators face a power‐sharing dilemma: Broadening elite incorporation mitigates prospects for outsider rebellions (by either elites excluded from power or the masses), but it raises the risk of insider coups. This article rethinks the theoretical foundations of the power‐sharing dilemma and its consequences. My findings contrast with and provide conditionalities for a “conventional threat logic,” which argues that large outsider threats compel dictators to create broader‐based regimes, despite raising coup risk. Instead, I analyze a game‐theoretic model to explain why the magnitude of the elite outsider threat ambiguously affects power‐sharing incentives. Dictators with weak coup‐proofing institutions or who face deeply entrenched elites take the opposite actions predicted by the conventional logic. An additional outsider threat from the masses can either exacerbate or eliminate the power‐sharing dilemma with elites, depending on elite affinity toward mass rule. Examining the elite‐mass interaction also generates new implications for how mass threats affect the likelihood of coups and regime overthrow.

Reshaping the Threat Environment: Personalism, Coups, and Assassinations

“…Power-sharing arrangements carry a trade-off concerning regime threats though. It generally increases insiders’ ability to oust the ruler even while decreasing their incentives to do so (Meng, 2020; Paine, 2021). And, while they lower the risk of coups (Svolik, 2012; Bove & Rivera, 2015; Frantz & Stein, 2017) and other violent challenges (Cheibub et al, 2010; Bartusevičius & Skaaning, 2018), some suggest that they make collective dissent more likely to occur by heightening citizens’ grievances and reducing the costs of mobilization (Fjelde, 2010; Woo & Conrad, 2019).…”

Rebel Strategies and the Prospects for Peace

“…In any period, any party can initiate conflict if the received share is unsatisfactory. Notably, the nature of conflict changes once they reach a peace deal and R is included in the government (Meng 2019; Paine 2021). Instead of fighting a civil war, G can purge the rebels, or R can stage a coup.…”

Entrepreneurs’ Ethnic and Political Identity Alignment as Determinants of Access to Government Support in Africa: A Conceptual Framework

“…Second, informal (or semi-formal) power-sharing arrangements with rival elite factions are more common as regime leaders seek to promote political stability and reduce the risk of an outsider attack (e.g., civil war or popular uprisings). Such power-sharing arrangements may take a form of appointments to cabinet positions (Arriola, 2009;Paine, 2020).…”

“…Additionally, power-sharing arrangements and elite bargaining process in such countries create the need for distribution of government resources among a broader group of constituencies (Opalo, 2020;Paine, 2020). Therefore, the roles of ethnic and political identity alignment in influencing government support are likely to be weaker in countries with greater levels of political constraints on leader power.…”