The Difference Indifference Makes in Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects

Jaramillo, Paula; Manjunath, Vikram

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1809955

Cited by 28 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Of course, those rules are not efficient 12 (and therefore, the rules proposed by Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011) and Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012) are not competitive) as the following example shows:…”

Section: Top Trading With Fixed Tie-breakingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Two recent and important contributions by Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011) and Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012) propose two distinct families of rules satisfying individual rationality, strategyproofness, and efficiency when indifferences are allowed. However, a foundation of the set of rules satisfying individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and efficiency is missing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 In Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011) it is not clear whether their algorithm is NP-hard or not whereas the algorithm by Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012) runs in polynomial O(|N | 5 ) time (which tends to infinity very quickly).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods

Ehlers¹

2014

Journal of Economic Theory

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We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. When preferences are strict, Gale's top trading cycle algorithm finds the unique core allocation. When preferences are not necessarily strict, we use an exogenous profile of tie-breakers to resolve any ties in individuals' preferences and apply Gale's top trading cycle algorithm for the resulting profile of strict preferences. We provide a foundation of these simple extensions of Gale's top trading cycle algorithm from strict preferences to weak preferences. We show that Gale's top trading cycle algorithm with fixed tie-breaking is characterized by individual rationality, strategy-proofness, weak efficiency, non-bossiness, and consistency. Our result supports the common practice in applications to break ties in weak preferences using some fixed exogenous criteria and then to use a "good and simple" rule for the resulting strict preferences. This reinforces the market-based approach even in the presence of indifferences because always competitive allocations are chosen.JEL Classification: C78, D63, D70

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Section: Top Trading With Fixed Tie-breakingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods

Ehlers¹

2014

Journal of Economic Theory

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“…Note that since every type contains a indifference set, the space of valuations (v t i (a)) a∈A : t i ∈ T I is a strict subset of R |A| + when |A| ≥ 5. 13 12 Jaramillo and Manjunath [18] study the consequences of accommodating indifference sets in the assignment problem of indivisible objects without money. 13 Here we use the fact that the indifference set of every type contains two or more alternatives.…”

Section: Discrete Public Projects With Indifference Setsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains

Carbajal

McLennan

Tourky

2013

Journal of Economic Theory

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Abstract. In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social choice function may possess: truthful implementation (in dominant strategies); monotonicity in differences; and lexicographic affine maximization. We introduce the notion of a flexible domain of preferences that allows elevation of pairs and study which of these conditions implies which others in such domain. We provide a generalization of the theorem of Roberts [36] in restricted valuation domains. Flexibility holds (and the theorem is not vacuous) if the domain of valuation profiles is restricted to the space of continuous functions defined on a compact metric space, or the space of piecewise linear functions defined on an affine space, or the space of smooth functions defined on a compact differentiable manifold. We provide applications of our results to public goods allocation settings, with finite and infinite alternative sets.JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D70, D82.

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“…This is not the case when indifferences are allowed and/or there are feasibility constraints [1,10,16]. For general assignments problems with non-empty strict core, Sönmez [36] shows that there are rules that satisfy individual rationality, (constrained) efficiency, and strategy-proofness only if the strict core is unique.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange

Nicolò

Álvarez

2017

Games and Economic Behavior

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We consider a model of Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) with feasibility constraints on the number of patient-donor pairs involved in exchanges. Patients' preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger donors to kidneys from older donors. In this framework, patients with compatible donors may enroll on PKE programs to receive an organ with higher expected graft survival than that of their intended donor. PKE rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness necessarily select pairwise exchanges.Such rules maximize the number of transplantations among pairs with the youngest donors, and sequentially among pairs with donors of different age groups. JEL: C78; D02; D78; I10.

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The Difference Indifference Makes in Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects

Cited by 28 publications

References 17 publications

Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods

Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods

Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains

Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange

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