The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects

Jaramillo, Paula; Manjunath, Vikram

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.017

Cited by 63 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Under strict preferences, single-unit demands and single-unit allocations, the wellknown Gale's Top Trading Cycles algorithm satisfies all the three 'gold standard' properties. If the preferences are allowed to be weak, there exist extensions of the TTC algorithm that satisfy the three properties (see e.g., (Jaramillo and Manjunath, 2012;Plaxton, 2013;Saban and Sethuraman, 2013)).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategyproof multi-item exchange under single-minded dichotomous preferences

Aziz

2019

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

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We consider multi-item exchange markets in which agents want to receive one of their target bundles of resources. The model encompasses well-studied markets for kidney exchange, lung exchange, and multi-organ exchange. We identify a general and sufficient condition called weak consistency for the exchange mechanisms to be strategyproof even if we impose any kind of distributional, diversity, or exchange cycle constraints. Within the class of weakly consistent and strategyproof mechanisms, we highlight two important ones that satisfy constrained Pareto optimality and strong individual rationality. Several results in the literature follow from our insights. We also derive impossibility results when constrained Pareto optimality is defined with respect to more permissive individual rationality requirements.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategyproof multi-item exchange under single-minded dichotomous preferences

Aziz

2019

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

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“…They assumed that agents have strict preferences and introduced mechanism that are individually rational, Pareto optimal and strategyproof. The results do not apply to the setting with dichotomous preferences In the restricted model of housing market, Jaramillo and Manjunath [7] proposed a mechanism called TCR that is polynomial-time, individually rational, Pareto optimal and strategyproof even if agents have indifferences. The results imply the same result for dichotomous preferences.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences

Aziz¹

2018

jMID

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“…One difficulty is that in our setting (in which there are multiple copies of identical goods), agents do not have strict preferences over goods, and even the top trading cycles algorithm without privacy is not incentive compatible. However, there are other algorithms such as (Saban and Sethuraman, 2013;Alcalde-Unzu and Molis, 2009;Jaramillo and Manjunath, 2012), that are incentive compatible in exchange markets that allow indifferences, so it may be possible. (It would also be interesting to find a connection between marginal differential privacy and incentive compatibility, like the known connections with differential privacy McSherry and Talwar (2007) and joint differential privacy Kearns et al (2014)).…”

Section: Conclusion/open Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Pareto Optimal Exchange

Kannan

Morgenstern

Rogers

et al. 2015

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

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We consider the problem of implementing an individually rational, asymptotically Pareto optimal allocation in a barter-exchange economy where agents are endowed with goods and preferences over the goods of others, but may not use money as a medium of exchange. Because one of the most important instantiations of such economies is kidney exchange -where the "input" to the problem consists of sensitive patient medical records -we ask to what extent such exchanges can be carried out while providing formal privacy guarantees to the participants. We show that individually rational allocations cannot achieve any non-trivial approximation to Pareto optimality if carried out under the constraint of differential privacy -or even the relaxation of joint-differential privacy, under which it is known that asymptotically optimal allocations can be computed in two sided markets [Hsu et al. STOC 2014]. We therefore consider a further relaxation that we call marginal -differential privacy -which promises, informally, that the privacy of every agent i is protected from every other agent j = i so long as j does not collude or share allocation information with other agents. We show that under marginal differential privacy, it is possible to compute an individually rational and asymptotically Pareto optimal allocation in such exchange economies.

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The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects

Cited by 63 publications

References 16 publications

Strategyproof multi-item exchange under single-minded dichotomous preferences

Strategyproof multi-item exchange under single-minded dichotomous preferences

Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences

Private Pareto Optimal Exchange

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