The Difference-to-Inference Model for Values in Science

Abstract

The value-free ideal for science holds that values should not influence the core features of scientific reasoning. We defend the difference-to-inference model of value-permeation, which holds that value-permeation in science is problematic when values make a difference to the inferences made about a hypothesis. This view of value-permeation is superior to existing views, and it suggests a corresponding maxim—namely, that scientists should strive to eliminate differences to inference. This maxim is the basis of a novel value-free ideal for science.

To Hedge or Not to Hedge: Scientific Claims and Public Justification

“…This argument resonates with the current Rawlsian literature as well as work by philosophers of science on the importance of consensus (Oreskes 2004;Miller 2013;Stegenga and Menon 2023). 4 Nevertheless, we think it doesn't capture the political value of hedging for two reasons.…”

“…Stegenga and Menon (2023) sketch a consensus-based argument for hedging that is slightly different from the one articulated in this section, as it aims to establish that there is epistemic rather than political reason to hedge. On their view, scientific knowledge requires consensus about both a claim and the validity of the "epistemic toolkit" by which it was arrived at.…”