The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and War

Kutz, Christopher

doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00028.x

Cited by 54 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…However, in the absence of an explanation as to why responsibility should be assigned differently to combatants than to noncombatants, the suggestion seems somewhat ad hoc. Kutz (2005)'s discussion of these issues seems to reflect a view somewhere between Zohar's and my own. On the one hand, Kutz seems to allow that insofar as an individual combatant has "partly authorized a war" by voluntarily taking part in it, he may be held responsible; on the other, he seems to hold that what such combatants are responsible for is "the collective decision to wage war," and should be punished, and presumably evaluated, "as a member of a collective" (p. 165, my emphasis).…”

Section: Against Revisionismmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…14 It is no doubt true that moral agents are sometimes morally accountable for what they do as a group, rather than what they do as individuals. Christopher Kutz (2000) has persuasively argued that an individual who knowingly promotes a group project may sometimes be held responsible for the harm caused by the group even if her own contribution is very small. 15 This, however, is a very different form of collective responsibility than that suggested by Mavrodes.…”

Section: Against Revisionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Terrorism, War, and The Killing of the Innocent

Jollimore

2007

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence. I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions in question tend to misunderstand the justification of both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum.

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Section: Against Revisionismmentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: Against Revisionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Terrorism, War, and The Killing of the Innocent

Jollimore

2007

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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“…Specifically, what is it about a concrete, existing individual that makes that person protected from attack, rather than merely the general agreement that certain broad and abstract categories have this protection? Christopher Kutz's (2005) discussion of inculpation and exculpation, while problematizing some of the issues of non-uniformed combatants, still retains a linkage between subjective and objective conditions of the combatant (and, by implication, the reverse of the noncombatant). Instead, the discussions of who is protected, and whom one is permitted to kill, come to subjective (in terms of alliance) and objective (providing military aid) factors, rather than some special characteristic of the noncombatant him/ herself.…”

Section: The Moral Conundrum Of the Noncombatantmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weaponized NonCombatants: A Moral Conundrum of Future Asymmetrical Warfare

Gray

2014

Journal of Military Ethics

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Liberal Arts Program, Texas A&M University at Qatar, Dubai Do noncombatants in warfare receive immunity because of their subjective or objective characteristics? Can a noncombatant be 'weaponized', and if so, how does this weaponization change the noncombatant's moral status as protected from direct attack? The purpose of this article is to analyze the moral issues that arise when noncombatants are made into weapons, specifically as delivery systems for biological weaponry. Examining such a tactic, I go on to explore how the problems that arise from 'weaponized' noncombatants illustrate deeper problems in the (under-)theorization of noncombatant status.

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“…Kutz 2005;McMahan 2007). Without indulging in a discussion of individual-oriented and community-oriented moral views (cf .…”

Section: Redder Bloodmentioning

confidence: 99%