The difficult construction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme: a step too far in Banking Union?

Howarth, David; Quaglia, Lucia

doi:10.4324/9781003020424-14

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

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“…Opponents, including the French government, argued that ex ante payments would hit banks hard during a difficult period and sought lengthy transition periods to build up funds (IMF, 2013;Howarth and Quaglia, 2017; interview 2). The initial Commission's proposal had been 1.5 per cent of eligible deposits raised over a ten-year transition period but French and other government opposition lowered this to 0.8 per cent.…”

Section: National Government and Bank Preferences On Deposit Insurancementioning

confidence: 99%

Stillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules^†

Asimakopoulos

Howarth

2021

J of Common Market Studies

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Our contribution demonstrates and explains the ineffectiveness of European Union (EU) bank resolution rules, a core element of Banking Union. This inadequacy owes in large part to the limited access to and insufficient availability of EU resolution funds and inadequate national deposit guarantee schemes in most EU member states, in conjunction with the relatively high minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for many EU banks. In many cases, these requirements are unlikely ever to be metparticularly for retail banks most likely to require resolution in the euro periphery. We offer a liberal intergovernmentalist analysis to explain the inadequacy of the EU resolution regime by examining German and French government preferences on EU rules on bank capital requirements agreed earlier in 2013 and national deposit guarantee schemes agreed in 2014. These government preferences were shaped significantly by the preferences of national banks and bank associations.

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Section: National Government and Bank Preferences On Deposit Insurancementioning

confidence: 99%

Stillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules^†

Asimakopoulos

Howarth

2021

J of Common Market Studies

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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The difficult construction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme: a step too far in Banking Union?

Abstract: This paper offers the Introduction to the Special Issue "Economic and Financial Governance in the European Union after a decade of Economic and Political Crises." We introduce the five papers. We distill three important lessons they offer for EU integration.

Cited by 1 publication

References 12 publications

Stillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules^†

Stillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules^†

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The difficult construction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme: a step too far in Banking Union?

Abstract: This paper offers the Introduction to the Special Issue "Economic and Financial Governance in the European Union after a decade of Economic and Political Crises." We introduce the five papers. We distill three important lessons they offer for EU integration.

Cited by 1 publication

References 12 publications

Stillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules†

Stillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules†

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

Stillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules^†

Stillborn Banking Union: Explaining Ineffective European Union Bank Resolution Rules^†