The Disadvantages of Free MIX Routes and How to Overcome Them

Berthold, Oliver; Pfitzmann, Andreas; Standtke, Ronny

doi:10.1007/3-540-44702-4_3

Cited by 106 publications

(108 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Even if all the above attacks are foiled, an adversary can mount a long-term intersection attack by correlating the times at which senders and receivers are active [7].…”

Section: The Intersection Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting Statistical Disclosure

Mathewson¹,

Dingledine²

2005

Privacy Enhancing Technologies

113

141

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Abstract. We extend earlier research on mounting and resisting passive long-term end-to-end traffic analysis attacks against anonymous message systems, by describing how an eavesdropper can learn sender-receiver connections even when the substrate is a network of pool mixes, the attacker is non-global, and senders have complex behavior including generating padding messages. Additionally, we describe how an attacker can use extra information about message distinguishability to speed the attack. Finally, we simulate our attacks for a variety of scenarios, focusing on the amount of information needed to link senders to their recipients. In each scenario, we show that the intersection attack can still succeed, albeit more slowly-in some cases, so slowly as to be impractical.

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“…Even if all the above attacks are foiled, an adversary can mount a long-term intersection attack by correlating the times at which senders and receivers are active [7].…”

Section: The Intersection Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting Statistical Disclosure

Mathewson¹,

Dingledine²

2005

Privacy Enhancing Technologies

113

141

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show abstract

“…Among a variety of privacy and threat models that have been proposed for ACSs [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], the important case when the adversary knows all the senders (inputs) and receivers (outputs) would render the anonymous system useless under the timebased profiling attack at hand: it would be enough for this adversary to observe the messages generated by the target user. In other words, under the assumption of an external and global attacker [20], [23], an ACS would not be an appropriate approach to thwart an adversary who strives to profile users based on their online activity.…”

Section: Privacy-enhancing Technologies Against Time-based Profiling mentioning

confidence: 99%

Shall I post this now? Optimized, delay-based privacy protection in social networks

Parra-Arnau

Mármol²,

Rebollo-Monedero

et al. 2016

Knowl Inf Syst

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Abstract-Despite the several advantages commonly attributed to social networks such as easiness and immediacy to communicate with acquaintances and friends, significant privacy threats provoked by unexperienced or even irresponsible users recklessly publishing sensitive material are also noticeable. Yet, a different, but equally significant privacy risk might arise from social networks profiling the online activity of their users based on the timestamp of the interactions between the former and the latter. In order to thwart this last type of commonly neglected attacks, this paper proposes an optimized deferral mechanism for messages in online social networks. Such solution suggests intelligently delaying certain messages posted by end users in social networks in a way that the observed online-activity profile generated by the attacker does not reveal any time-based sensitive information, while preserving the usability of the system. Experimental results as well as a proposed architecture implementing this approach demonstrate the suitability and feasibility of our mechanism.

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“…Berthold et al [1] proposed to simply count the size ("cardinality") of the anonymity set: a larger list of candidates for the true sender or receiver corresponds to better anonymity. By taking the logarithm of the set size, base 2, this quantity can be expressed in bits.…”

Section: Measuring Anonymitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantifying and Measuring Anonymity

Murdoch

2014

Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Security

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Abstract. The design of anonymous communication systems is a relatively new field, but the desire to quantify the security these systems offer has been an important topic of research since its beginning. In recent years, anonymous communication systems have evolved from obscure tools used by specialists to mass-market software used by millions of people. In many cases the users of these tools are depending on the anonymity offered to protect their liberty, or more. As such, it is of critical importance that not only can we quantify the anonymity these tools offer, but that the metrics used represent realistic expectations, can be communicated clearly, and the implementations actually offer the anonymity they promise. This paper will discuss how metrics, and the techniques used to measure them, have been developed for anonymous communication tools including low-latency networks and high-latency email systems.

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The Disadvantages of Free MIX Routes and How to Overcome Them

Cited by 106 publications

References 8 publications

Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting Statistical Disclosure

Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting Statistical Disclosure

Shall I post this now? Optimized, delay-based privacy protection in social networks

Quantifying and Measuring Anonymity

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