The Discontinuity Effect in Interpersonal and Intergroup Relations: Generality and Mediation

Schopler, John; Insko, Chester A.

doi:10.1080/14792779243000041

Cited by 175 publications

(161 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Forming contingent agreements may require a level of trust and monitoring beyond trade-off agreements, and may appear less legitimate than trade-offs as a result (e.g ., occasionally we find people who tell us "I would never bet on something as significant as this" ; Lax & Sebenius, 1986) . As team negotiations may be more contentious than individual negotiations (Schopler & Insko, 1992), this may be a countervailing tendency to the benefit of greater information sharing among groups .…”

Section: Contrasts With Team Learning Phenomenamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the positive side, negotiating teams might have greater attentional capacity, and they may share more information than do individuals (Brodt & Thompson, 2001 ;O'Connor, 1997 ;Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996) . On the negative side, Schopler and Insko (1992 ;Insko & Schopler, 1987) found that teams engage in a greater degree of competitive behavior than do solo negotiators . Competitive behavior is likely to increase the use of habitual responses rather than novel responses, and hence, using the new study cases could be less likely among teams than among individuals .…”

Section: Team Learning In Negotiationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Analogical Learning in Negotiation Teams: Comparing Cases Promotes Learning and Transfer

Loewenstein

Thompson

Gentner

2003

AMLE

137

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Section: Contrasts With Team Learning Phenomenamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Team Learning In Negotiationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analogical Learning in Negotiation Teams: Comparing Cases Promotes Learning and Transfer

Loewenstein

Thompson

Gentner

2003

AMLE

137

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“…Insko, Schopler and their colleagues were among the first to examine the tendency of small groups to behave more competitively-an effect dubbed the inter-individual inter-group discontinuity effect [80][81][82][83][84][85][86] . These authors first examined group behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma (hereafter PD) games, perhaps because of this game's enormous popularity in previous decades.…”

Section: Prisoner's Dilemma Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are groups more rational than individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groups

Kugler

Kausel

Kocher

2012

WIRES Cognitive Science

201

146

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Many decisions are interactive; the outcome of one party depends not only on its decisions or on acts of nature but also on the decisions of others. In the present article, we review the literature on decision making made by groups of the past 25 years. Researchers have compared the strategic behavior of groups and individuals in many games: prisoner's dilemma, dictator, ultimatum, trust, centipede and principal-agent games, among others. Our review suggests that results are quite consistent in revealing that groups behave closer to the game-theoretical assumption of rationality and selfishness than individuals. We conclude by discussing future research avenues in this area. JEL-Code: C910, C920.

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“…This finding, dubbed the Discontinuity Effect, has mainly been advanced in research by Chester Insko, John Schopler and their various co-authors (eg. Schopler & Insko 1992; see Insko et al 1998 for an overview of this research). The authors repeatedly show that groups choose competitive options (in a prisoners' dilemma environment) more often than individuals do.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cartel formation and pricing: The effect of managerial decision-making rules

Gillet

Schram

Sonnemans

2011

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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We experimentally investigate how the managerial decision making process affects choices in a Bertrand pricing game with an opportunity to form non-binding cartels. To do so we compare the effects of three decision-making rules for the firm (decisions by CEOs, majority rule and consensus) to each other and to decisions in a benchmark consisting of single-individual firms. It has been argued elsewhere that groups behave more competitively than individuals. In this setting this predicts that for all three decision-making rules we should observe fewer cartels and lower prices. This is not what we find. For the formation of cartels, there are no differences across treatments. For prices asked, we find that first, cartels lead to higher prices in al treatments, despite the fact that they are non-binding. Second, the decision-making rules strongly affect the prices asked. One thing that stands out is that firms run by CEOs ask higher prices than observed in the other treatments.JEL Codes: C92; L40; L2

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The Discontinuity Effect in Interpersonal and Intergroup Relations: Generality and Mediation

Cited by 175 publications

References 39 publications

Analogical Learning in Negotiation Teams: Comparing Cases Promotes Learning and Transfer

Analogical Learning in Negotiation Teams: Comparing Cases Promotes Learning and Transfer

Are groups more rational than individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groups

Cartel formation and pricing: The effect of managerial decision-making rules

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