The disempowering implications for members of marginalized groups of imposing a focus on personal experiences in discussions of intergroup issues.

Abstract

In contrast to when members of marginalized groups choose to share their personal experiences on their own terms and in service of their own goals, when outside forces impose a focus on personal experiences in discussions of intergroup policies, there is instead the potential for disempowering implications: Being asked by someone else to approach intergroup issues through the specific lens of their personal experience may lead members of marginalized groups to sense that they are seen as the target of others’ harmful (e.g., discrimination) or benevolent (e.g., empathy) moral actions. According to research and theory on moral typecasting, perceiving a person as a target is fundamentally incompatible with perceiving them as an agent and thus is linked to lower perceived competence. Extending this theory to self-perceptions, seven studies provide evidence for an imposed experience focus effect, whereby being prompted to talk about their personal experiences (vs. reasoning) in discussions of intergroup issues reduces racialized individuals’ momentary feelings of power and power-relevant behaviors such as exerting social influence over White individuals’ opinions. Perceptions of being viewed as less competent by others or seeing themselves as less competent in the moment were consistently implicated in this effect, which was not evident for White individuals or in discussions of general topics. Asking members of marginalized groups for their opinions in an open manner, or asking about their reasoning or personal firsthand knowledge, all appear to constitute means of learning about their perspective on intergroup issues in a more empowering way.

Rejecting an intergroup apology attenuates perceived differences between victim and perpetrator groups in morality and power.

“…However, literature underscores that agency encompasses the two facets of ability (also referred to as competence; Abele et al, 2016; Leach et al, 2007) and assertiveness, with power arguably being more clearly represented by assertiveness. As argued by Fiske et al (2002), power is crucially intertwined with ability as group members are perceived “as less competent to the extent that they are perceived as powerless and [of] low status” (p. 881), potentially due to a correspondence bias, just-world thinking, or system justification (on the close link between ability and power, see also Vorauer & Petsnik, 2023; Wang et al, 2018). Nevertheless, items that capture assertiveness (e.g., strength, control, influence) rather than ability (e.g., smartness) may constitute a purer measure of power.…”

Rejecting an Intergroup Apology Attenuates Perceived Differences Between Victim and Perpetrator Groups in Morality and Power

“…However, literature underscores that agency encompasses the two facets of ability (also referred to as competence, Abele et al, 2016;Leach et al, 2007) and assertiveness, with power arguably being more clearly represented by assertiveness. As argued by Fiske et al (2002), power is crucially intertwined with ability as group members are perceived "as less competent to the extent that they are perceived as powerless and [of] low status" (p. 881), potentially due to a correspondence bias, just-world thinking or system justification (on the close link between ability and power, see also Vorauer & Petsnik, 2023;Wang et al, 2018). Nevertheless, items that capture assertiveness (e.g., strength, control, influence) rather than ability (e.g., smartness) may constitute a purer measure of power.…”