The disoriented self. Layers and dynamics of self-experience in dementia and schizophrenia

Summa, Michela

doi:10.1007/s11097-013-9313-3

Cited by 16 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 28 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…However important though this progressive loss of memory may be, the more significant disturbance of dementia only shows in its further course. It is a fundamental impairment of the higher-order capacity of reflexivity and decentering, which was already pointed out by Zutt (1963), Tatossian (1987) and Summa (2014). What is at stake is the particular human capacity of stepping out of one's bodily center and taking a virtual perspective on oneself, which is simultaneously the possible perspective of others -that what Plessner (1928Plessner ( /2019 has termed the "excentric position" of the human being.…”

Section: Dementia As a Loss Of Reflexivity And Meta-perspectivementioning

confidence: 98%

Embodiment and personal identity in dementia

Fuchs

2020

Med Health Care and Philos

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Theories of personal identity in the tradition of John Locke and Derek Parfit emphasize the importance of psychological continuity and the abilities to think, to remember and to make rational choices as a basic criterion for personhood. As a consequence, persons with severe dementia are threatened to lose the status of persons. Such concepts, however, are situated within a dualistic framework, in which the body is regarded as a mere vehicle of the person, or a carrier of the brain as the organ of mental faculties. Based on the phenomenology of embodiment, this paper elaborates a different approach to personal identity in dementia. In this perspective, selfhood is primarily constituted by pre-reflective self-awareness and the body memory of an individual, which consists in the embodiment and enactment of familiar habits, practices and preferences. After describing the different types of body memory, the paper develops a phenomenology of dementia as a loss of reflexivity and meta-perspective. This is contrasted with the preservation of individual forms of body memory even in the later stages of the illness. The ethical consequences of an embodied approach to dementia are outlined. A final look is given to narrativistic and constructionist concepts of the self in dementia.

show abstract

Section: Dementia As a Loss Of Reflexivity And Meta-perspectivementioning

confidence: 98%

Embodiment and personal identity in dementia

Fuchs

2020

Med Health Care and Philos

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The ambiguous conception of personhood in dementia is addressed by a wide range of authors (Hydén et al 2014;Kontos 2012;Summa 2014;Snyder 2006;Tewes 2021;Wray 2020). Many of them argue that personhood is constituted in social practices.…”

Section: Social and Embodied Personhood In Dementiamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such a view accounts for the bodily expression of the feelings, thoughts, desires, and intentions that constitute a human personality, recognized by others, through which a person responds to situations they encounter. Käll (2018), for instance, discusses the case of Auguste Deter, a 8 With reference to Summa (2014), Fuchs (2018), and Zahavi's (2017) descriptions of the self in dementia, we might conclude that, in ADRD, there is limited access to explicit and reflective knowledge of spatiotemporal and social situations. That is why, despite the fact that minimal situational orientation is preserved in ADRD-via the "situational body-memory" and a pre-reflective "perspectival ownership"persons with ADRD find it increasingly difficult to mentally transcend their current situation and integrate contextual information such as addresses, dates, weekdays, or names (Fuchs 2018;Zahavi 2017; Dzwiza-Ohlsen 2021).…”

Section: Social and Embodied Personhood In Dementiamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That is why, despite the fact that minimal situational orientation is preserved in ADRD-via the "situational body-memory" and a pre-reflective "perspectival ownership"persons with ADRD find it increasingly difficult to mentally transcend their current situation and integrate contextual information such as addresses, dates, weekdays, or names (Fuchs 2018;Zahavi 2017; Dzwiza-Ohlsen 2021). 9 For critical remarks on Zahavi's notion of the "minimal self" (2017), see Summa (2014) and De Monticelli (2020). Unlike Zahavi's minimal self, which refers to basic layers of pre-reflective experiences made by the self, these authors present a more nuanced theory of selfhood in which the pre-reflective self amounts to an integral and substantive part of a "narrative self."…”

Section: Social and Embodied Personhood In Dementiamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…11 If body memories are reactivated in specific ways, they make autobiographical aspects of life history available that are no longer accessible as explicit memory. Body memory is therefore an implicit form of memory and pre-reflective capacity that is maintained in dementia until the latest stages (Summa 2014). This is why Fuchs speaks of a basic self-experience in dementia: we have always been familiar with ourselves, and this self-familiarity is something that is felt physically, rather than explicitly known (50).…”

Section: Interbodily Resonance and Body Memorymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Disrupted Intercorporeality and Embodiedness in Dementia Care during the COVID-19 Crisis

Winniewski

2022

pjcp

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, I address the effects of social distancing for embodied lived experience in relation to dementia care and experiences of dementia. From a critical phenomenological perspective, I focus specifically on the safety measures of physical distancing and face-masking in pandemic times, asking whether they might risk marginalizing and disembodying people with dementia, especially in isolated healthcare settings. As much as these measures offer physical protection against spreading the virus, I consider how they might disrupt intersubjective processes (e.g., calming social or therapeutic touch) and contribute to “an alienated bodily communication” (Dolezal 2020). From Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies of embodiment and enactive theories of intersubjectivity, to more recent phenomenological work on illness, many authors argue that our existential being-in-the-world is embodied in multimodal and intersubjective ways (Fuchs and De Jaeger 2009; Carel 2016; Ratcliffe 2008; Kontos 2011). For this reason, our lived bodies need to stay in touch and positively interact with other lived bodies. Based on empirical studies of multisensory and interactive therapy in nursing homes before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, I emphasize the effects of distant socializing for patients, care, and carers. My aim is to address the broader structures and discursive practices, which have undergone dramatic changes due to the spread of COVID-19.

show abstract

The Lived Body in E-motion: A Transdisciplinary Approach to Dementia Diseases

Winniewski,

Dzwiza-Ohlsen

2024

Contributions to Phenomenology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The disoriented self. Layers and dynamics of self-experience in dementia and schizophrenia

Cited by 16 publications

References 28 publications

Embodiment and personal identity in dementia

Embodiment and personal identity in dementia

Disrupted Intercorporeality and Embodiedness in Dementia Care during the COVID-19 Crisis

The Lived Body in E-motion: A Transdisciplinary Approach to Dementia Diseases

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About