The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China's Hegemonic Prospects

Abstract

Existing theories predict that the rise of China will trigger a hegemonic transition and the current debate centers on whether or not the transition will be violent or peaceful. This debate largely sidesteps two questions that are central to understanding the future of international order: how strong is the current Western hegemonic order and what is the likelihood that China can or will lead a successful counter-hegemonic challenge? We argue that the future of international order is shaped not only by material power but also by the distribution of identity across the great powers. We develop a constructivist account of hegemonic transition that theorizes the role of the distribution of identity in international order. In our account, hegemonic orders depend on a legitimating ideology that must be consistent with the distribution of identity at both the level of elites and masses. We map the distribution of identity across nine great powers and assess how this distribution supports the current Western neoliberal democratic hegemony. We conclude that China is unlikely to become the hegemon in the near-term. First, the present order is strongly supported by the distribution of identity in both Western states and rising powers like India and Brazil. Second, China is unlikely to join the present order and lead a transition from within because its authoritarian identity conflicts with the democratic ideology of the present order. Finally, China is unlikely to lead a counter-hegemonic coalition of great powers because it will be difficult to build an appealing, universal ideology consistent with the identities of other great powers. used in the piece:

Everyday Nationalism and Making Identity Count

“…The same insights originally inspired our conceptualization of national identity (Hopf 2002(Hopf , 2010. However, one of the main theoretical inspirations for our MIC project is Gramsci and his writings on social order and change through hegemony and its challengers (Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018;Hopf 2013). We now think that our neo-Gramscian framework could be profitably used in EN as well.…”

“…A more enduring and comprehensive, or thick hegemony, would be one that is accepted as commonsensical by masses as well. If MIC analysis shows that "Western democracy" is what makes sense to both elites and masses across different countries, then we can conclude that China's bid for hegemony is unlikely to be successful (Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018). Along the same lines, but looking at the literature on "pop culture and world politics," MIC research could be used to determine which pop culture aspects of global daily life are in fact global (e.g., Nexon and Neumann 2006;Grayson, Davies, and Philpott 2009;Furman and Musgrave 2017).…”

Racialised international order? Traces of ‘yellow peril’ trope in Germany’s public discourse toward China

“…Allan et al have recently argued that China's authoritarian character poses an ideational barrier to its eventual acceptance as a new global hegemon (Allan, Vucetic and Hopf 2018). They argue that Western publics adhere to a democratic and (neo-)liberal order and are unlikely to consent to the leadership of an authoritarian China whose economy is heavily state-led.…”

Contending Narratives of the International Order: US/Chinese Discursive Power and Its Effects on the UK

“…In this sense, it is difficult for the Chinese narratives of the international order to have any meaningful effects on the United Kingdom's liberal democratic values. As Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf (2018) argue, China is unlikely to lead a successful counterhegemonic challenge to the LIO, as its authoritarian identity conflicts with the democratic ideology of other great powers within the current order. The LIO may not be functioning as it should, but what is needed, in the words of the British diplomat Laura Clarke, is "a reinvigoration of the values that underpin it" (Clarke 2018).…”