The diversity of design of TSOs

Rious, Vincent; Glachant, Jean–Michel; Pérez, Yannick; Dessante, Philippe

doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2008.05.010

Cited by 35 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Toutefois, cette méthode présente des lacunes. Le calcul de ces coûts peut s'avérer complexe, du fait des nombreuses externalités positives des investissements dans le réseau de transport (Rious et al, 2008). En outre, les coûts de renforcement ne délivrent d'incitation qu'au moment de l'investissement.…”

Section: 1 Dimension Spatialeunclassified

Design des marchés d’électricité pour l’intégration des renouvelables

Henriot¹,

Glachant²

2014

rei

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Cet article analyse l’impact de l’intégration des renouvelables dans les marchés de l’électricité en Europe. La nature de ce problème d’efficacité économique est analysée à la lueur des contributions existantes dans la littérature. Les éventuels obstacles à un fonctionnement sous des règles de marché communes à tous les producteurs sont exposés en tenant compte des différences fondamentales entre producteurs traditionnels et renouvelables. L’article s’intéresse ensuite aux différents outils proposés pour assurer le fonctionnement du marché dans un contexte de faible prévisibilité et de variabilité de la production des renouvelables. Les solutions suivantes sont examinées : unités de temps plus précises, nouvelles limites aux prix de gros, meilleure articulation de la séquence de marchés d’ajustement, introduction de mécanismes de rémunération de capacité. Nous nous intéressons également à la redéfinition de l’espace, depuis la tarification nodale jusqu’à la possible émergence d’une multitude de marchés locaux.

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Section: 1 Dimension Spatialeunclassified

Design des marchés d’électricité pour l’intégration des renouvelables

Henriot¹,

Glachant²

2014

rei

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“…However, there are already practical and theoretical recognitions that the network operators perform heterogeneous tasks requiring distinct regulatory tools (See Rious et al, 2008 andKhalfallah and for electricity transmission; Glachant et al, 2005and Saplacan, 2008 for electricity distribution). We may operationalize this network reality by distinguishing four main network tasks.…”

Section: The Heterogeneity Of Network Operators' Tasksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, in practice the regulated companies perform several tasks 2 with heterogeneous regulatory characteristics, which actually require distinct regulatory tools (See Rious et al, 2008 andSaguan et al, 2008 for electricity transmission and Saplacan, 2008 for electricity distribution). For instance, price cap regulation is known to be an efficient tool for network maintenance while congestion, losses or service quality are better regulated with output or performance-based regulation.…”

Section: Introduction *mentioning

confidence: 99%

Implementing Incentive Regulation and Regulatory Alignment with Resource Bounded Regulators

Glachant

Khalfallah²,

Pérez³

et al. 2013

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries

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. Implementing incentive regulation through an alignment with resource bounded regulators. Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, SAGE Publications, 2013, 14 (3), pp.265-291. ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced StudiesThe Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Stefano Bartolini since September 2006, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society.The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the European Union. Florence School of RegulationThe Florence School of Regulation (FSR) is a partnership between the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) at the European University Institute (EUI), the Council of the European Energy Regulators (CEER) and the Independent Regulators Group (IRG). Moreover, as part of the EUI, the FSR works closely with the European Commission.The objectives of the FSR are to promote informed discussions on key policy issues, through workshops and seminars, to provide state-of-the-art training for practitioners (from European Commission, National Regulators and private companies), to produce analytical and empirical researches about regulated sectors, to network, and to exchange documents and ideas.At present, its scope is focused on the regulation of Energy (electricity and gas markets), of Communications & Media, and of Transport.This series of working papers aims at disseminating the work of scholars and practitioners on current regulatory issues. For further information AbstractIt is puzzling today to explain both the diversity and the rationale of regulators' practice vis-à-vis network monopolies. We argue that two fundamental characteristics should be considered when defining the most appropriate regulatory tools. First, it is the bounded endowment of regulators set by governments and legislators which determines their abilities (staff, budget, administrative powers) to implement any of the regulatory tools. Ranked from the easiest to the most demanding to implement, these various tools are: a-cost plus, b-price/revenue cap, c-output or performance-based regulation, d-menu of contracts and e-yardstick competition. Second, the regulators also have to take into account that the network monopolies perform multiple tasks with heterogeneous regulatory characteristics (in terms of controllability, ex ante predictability and ex post observability). These characteristics of tasks determine what type of regulatory tool is more likely to better regulate each task. The regulatory tools then perform well only when they are implemented for tasks that are controllable and predictabl...

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“…In this case, it is the producers of the basic service who make the decisions to invest in the network (in capacity and technology choice) and who assume the future consequences. Conversely, in instances in which network infrastructures remain monopolies having been separated from the basic service through "unbundling", it is the infrastructure manager -more or less well regulated -who makes investment decisions (Léauthier & Thelen, 2008;Rious et al, 2008). However, this requires anticipating the future activities of producers of the basic services and the future behaviour of final consumers (Rious, Glachant, & Dessante, 2010).…”

Section: A Renewed Interest In the Economics Of Fixed Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating Networks in the New Economy

Glachant

2012

Review of Economics and Institutions

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Abstract:The regulation of network industries has undergone profound transformation in the past twenty years. The regulated industry is no longer the same, being exposed to new competitive dynamics having revolutionized their industrial framework, technology and interactions with users. There also have been fundamental changes in what regulation is feasible. In an "information society" a model devised in the 19th century to set prices for monopoly infrastructures such as bridges, roads and railways no longer captures the essential: the interactive dynamics created by technologies, uses, and markets.JEL classification: L51; L94; L97

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The diversity of design of TSOs

Cited by 35 publications

References 21 publications

Design des marchés d’électricité pour l’intégration des renouvelables

Design des marchés d’électricité pour l’intégration des renouvelables

Implementing Incentive Regulation and Regulatory Alignment with Resource Bounded Regulators

Regulating Networks in the New Economy

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