The Dodge CSP-1 Continuous Sampling Plan Under Inspection Error<sup>1</sup>

Case, Kenneth E.; Bennett, G. Kemble; Schmidt, J. W.

doi:10.1080/05695557308974902

Cited by 31 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…9 Pradiptyo (2007) notes that inspection games with mixed-strategy equilibria can have punishment costs being irrelevant for the inspectee's optimal strategy. While the impact of inspection errors on the CSP-1 algorithm has been investigated by Case et al (1973), this paper focuses on the behavioural implications of decision errors by the regulator in the game. 10 Jin and Lee (2011), for example, discuss the motivations for inspection errors in a practical setting.…”

Section: One-shot Biosecurity Inspection Game (I) Game Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…10 Jin and Lee (2011), for example, discuss the motivations for inspection errors in a practical setting. While the impact of inspection errors on the CSP-1 algorithm has been investigated by Case et al (1973), this paper focuses on the behavioural implications of decision errors by the regulator in the game. tractability, both agents are assumed to be riskneutral decision-makers.…”

Section: One-shot Biosecurity Inspection Game (I) Game Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Designing Biosecurity Inspection Regimes to Account for Stakeholder Incentives: An Inspection Game Approach

Rossiter

Hester

2017

Economic Record

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We investigate the potential for biosecurity regulators to design inspection regimes that reduce intervention and encourage importers to decrease the likelihood of biosecurity risk material being present in consignments. The interaction between a biosecurity regulator and a vertically integrated importer is framed as an inspection game. Our principal focus is a dynamic version of the game, which we use to assess whether regimes based on past compliance can encourage behaviours consistent with the regulatory objective. Our results suggest appropriate candidates for compliance-based inspection regimes are goods where there is access to cost-effective 'fixed' abatement technologies, and those with high costs associated with being inspected or failing inspection.*The authors thank Simon Loertscher, Peter Bardsley and Gary Stoneham for their comments on earlier versions of this work and the assistance provided by Australian Government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources staff members, particularly Christina Aston and Jessica Sibley, with other parts of the broader project. Tom Wilkening and Simon Angus provided much appreciated advice on computational aspects associated with this paper. Discussions with Lana Friesen on alternative regulatory approaches using tournaments and Andrew Robinson on the continuous sampling plan algorithms are also appreciated.

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Section: One-shot Biosecurity Inspection Game (I) Game Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: One-shot Biosecurity Inspection Game (I) Game Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing Biosecurity Inspection Regimes to Account for Stakeholder Incentives: An Inspection Game Approach

Rossiter

Hester

2017

Economic Record

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“…Obviously, such an assumption is impractical, because there are two types of inspection errors in normal inspection: Type I can lead to an increase in the production cost and Type II can affect customer loyalty. The presence of inspection errors in CSP-1 was first discussed by Case et al [1], who mentioned the need for an alternate sampling method. They developed a compensating sampling plan, considering inspection errors, which yield the desired actual AOQL.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A mixed inspection policy for CSP-2 and precise inspection under inspection errors and return cost

Chang

Chiang

2010

Journal of the Chinese Institute of Industrial Engineers

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This article deals with a mixed policy between precise inspection and continuous sampling plan-2 (CSP-2) with inspection errors (Types I and II) and return cost. The optimal mixed inspection policy is determined by using the criterion of maximizing the unit net profit. Specifically, with respect to non-repairable and repairable products, the following decision variables are determined such that the unit net profit is maximal: (1) the optimal sampling plan for CSP-2 and (2) the optimal proportions for which precise inspection should be performed for the non-inspected items in the procedure of CSP-2, the non-defective items, and the defective items identified by CSP-2. Overall, the analytical results indicate that, depending on the nine parameters (the process defective fraction, Type I error, Type II error, the selling price of an item, the unit repair cost, the unit return cost, the unit opportunity cost, the unit inspection cost, and the unit cost of precise inspection), both non-repairable and repairable products have two main optimal inspection policies for CSP-2: ''do not inspect'' and ''do 100% inspection''; also, for the non-inspected items, the non-defective items, and the defective items identified in CSP-2, there are two main proportions on which precise inspection should be performed: 100% and 0%. A numerical example is provided to illustrate the proposed method. Besides, a comparison with CSP-2 is also made to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed model.

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“…Dodge's original long-run framework has been adapted to handle imperfect testing, and the appreciable effect of imperfect testing on the performance parameters of the sampling plan is well-understood [2]. The original long-run production framework was also adapted to account for short-run contexts [3,4]; however, the assumption of perfect testing was retained.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Short-Run Contexts and Imperfect Testing for Continuous Sampling Plans

Rodriguez

Jeske

2018

Algorithms

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Continuous sampling plans are used to ensure a high level of quality for items produced in long-run contexts. The basic idea of these plans is to alternate between 100% inspection and a reduced rate of inspection frequency. Any inspected item that is found to be defective is replaced with a non-defective item. Because not all items are inspected, some defective items will escape to the customer. Analytical formulas have been developed that measure both the customer perceived quality and also the level of inspection effort. The analysis of continuous sampling plans does not apply to short-run contexts, where only a finite-size batch of items is to be produced. In this paper, a simulation algorithm is designed and implemented to analyze the customer perceived quality and the level of inspection effort for short-run contexts. A parameter representing the effectiveness of the test used during inspection is introduced to the analysis, and an analytical approximation is discussed. An application of the simulation algorithm that helped answer questions for the U.S. Navy is discussed.

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The Dodge CSP-1 Continuous Sampling Plan Under Inspection Error¹

Cited by 31 publications

References 4 publications

Designing Biosecurity Inspection Regimes to Account for Stakeholder Incentives: An Inspection Game Approach

Designing Biosecurity Inspection Regimes to Account for Stakeholder Incentives: An Inspection Game Approach

A mixed inspection policy for CSP-2 and precise inspection under inspection errors and return cost

Short-Run Contexts and Imperfect Testing for Continuous Sampling Plans

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The Dodge CSP-1 Continuous Sampling Plan Under Inspection Error1

Cited by 31 publications

References 4 publications

Designing Biosecurity Inspection Regimes to Account for Stakeholder Incentives: An Inspection Game Approach

Designing Biosecurity Inspection Regimes to Account for Stakeholder Incentives: An Inspection Game Approach

A mixed inspection policy for CSP-2 and precise inspection under inspection errors and return cost

Short-Run Contexts and Imperfect Testing for Continuous Sampling Plans

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Product

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The Dodge CSP-1 Continuous Sampling Plan Under Inspection Error¹