The domestic consequences of international over-cooperation: An experimental study of microfoundations

Davies, Graeme A. M.; Johns, Robert

doi:10.1177/0738894215577556

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…Studies such as Sigelman and Sigelman (), Cuckierman and Tommasi (), and Cowen and Sutter () assume that the “election” or “poll” happens before the response by the other state is known and thus before the policy can be deemed successful or not. More recent work (e.g., Clare ; Colaresi ; Davies and Johns ; Schultz ) takes into consideration that voters might update their opinions based on the adversary's reaction. Interestingly, these studies formulate quite different expectations about how voters respond to success and failure of conciliatory policies by hawks and doves.…”

Section: The Theoretical Basis Of the Hawk's Advantagementioning

confidence: 99%

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Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach

Mattes

Weeks

2018

American J Political Sci

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An old adage holds that "only Nixon could go to China"; that is, hawkish leaders face fewer domestic barriers than doves when it comes to pursuing reconciliation with foreign enemies. However, empirical evidence for this proposition is mixed. In this article, we clarify competing theories, elucidate their implications for public opinion, and describe the results of a series of survey experiments designed to evaluate whether and why there is a hawk's advantage. We find that hawks are indeed better positioned domestically to initiate rapprochement than doves. We also find support for two key causal mechanisms: Voters are more confident in rapprochement when it is pursued by a hawk and are more likely to view hawks who initiate conciliation as moderates. Further, the hawk's advantage persists whether conciliatory efforts end in success or failure. Our microfoundational evidence thus suggests a pronounced domestic advantage for hawks who deliver the olive branch.

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Section: The Theoretical Basis Of the Hawk's Advantagementioning

confidence: 99%

“…A recent experimental study found that British voters generally disapproved of policy failures but were especially likely to punish leaders who they thought had over‐cooperated with an adversary; however, this study does not consider leader type (Davies and Johns ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach

Mattes

Weeks

2018

American J Political Sci

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“…In his empirical analysis of leaders’ tenures, Colaresi (2004) finds that dovish leaders are more likely to lose power than their hawkish counterparts. Supporting this logic, Davies and Johns (2016: 343) use a survey experiment and find that “a hawkish failure wins more public sympathy than a failed inducement.” The population in rival states might request a more coercive crisis behavior to restore a sense of national pride that has been challenged by repeated violence (Crescenzi et al, 2007: 657). Alternatively, military action might be more popular because using force might be considered as a simpler solution to ongoing violence (Davies and Johns, 2016: 347).…”

Section: Research On Crisis Escalation and Precrisis Hostilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Supporting this logic, Davies and Johns (2016: 343) use a survey experiment and find that “a hawkish failure wins more public sympathy than a failed inducement.” The population in rival states might request a more coercive crisis behavior to restore a sense of national pride that has been challenged by repeated violence (Crescenzi et al, 2007: 657). Alternatively, military action might be more popular because using force might be considered as a simpler solution to ongoing violence (Davies and Johns, 2016: 347). What is common to these explanations is that a history of persistent violence increases public expectation and pressure for violent escalation during crises.…”

Section: Research On Crisis Escalation and Precrisis Hostilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Precrisis military hostility and escalation in international crises

Levin-Banchik

2020

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Why do some international crises escalate into violence while others do not? I argue that an understanding of crisis behavior necessitates awareness of the processes preceding a crisis and propose two mechanisms that link precrisis hostility with crisis violence. The population fatigue mechanism suggests that precrisis hostility interrupts the everyday life of a population, strengthening its demand for a harsher response. If leaders behave with restraint during a crisis and after the crisis hostilities resume, leaders risk facing greater dissatisfaction from their now even more fatigued population. The baseline for resolve mechanism suggests that if states are actively hostile before a crisis, they must maintain hostility during a crisis to credibly demonstrate resolve. Findings on international crises between 1918 and 2010 support the interphase relationship: a crisis escalation is significantly more likely after a hostile precrisis period. The behavior of opponents can indicate how crises might unfold even before they begin.

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“…28.Brutger 2017; Davies and Johns 2013, 2016; Fearon 1994; Kertzer and Brutger 2016; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012; Potter and Baum 2014; Schultz 2001; Tomz 2007a; Trager and Vavreck 2011; Weeks 2008.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs

Brutger¹,

Kertzer²

2018

Int Org

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Politicians frequently turn to reputational arguments to bolster support for their proposed foreign policies. Yet despite the prevailing belief that domestic audiences care about reputation, there is very little direct evidence that publics care about reputation costs, and very little understanding of how. We propose a dispositional theory of reputation costs in which citizens facing ill-defined strategic situations turn to their core predispositions about foreign affairs in order to weigh competing reputational dimensions. Employing a diverse array of methodological tools—from vignette-based survey experiments to automated text analysis—we show that the mass public has a “taste” for reputation, but understands it in fundamentally different ways, with hawks concerned about the negative reputational consequences of inconsistency, and doves equally concerned with the negative reputational consequences of belligerence and interventionism. In illustrating how reputation costs are in our heads, our findings offer both good and bad news for theories of reputation in IR.

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The domestic consequences of international over-cooperation: An experimental study of microfoundations

Cited by 10 publications

References 77 publications

Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach

Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach

Precrisis military hostility and escalation in international crises

A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs

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