The Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy Behavior in Middle Eastern Enduring Rivals, 1948-1998

Abstract

Rivalry‐related issues tend to dominate the foreign policy agenda of states in enduring rivalries. Thus, the enduring rivalry research program provides an important framework for foreign policy analysis. This paper probes the domestic elements of strategic interaction in the three main Middle Eastern rivalries: Israel–Egypt, Israel–Jordan, and Israel–Syria. The empirical tests probe whether the number of parties represented in Israel's cabinet and Arab and Israeli domestic unrest impact the propensity for these rivals to employ hostility against each other. We specify vector autoregression (VAR) models and negative binomial event count models with monthly levels of hostility as the dependent variables for the period 1948–1998. The results provide interesting foreign policy implications regarding the impact of Israeli domestic political structures on conflict dynamics in the Middle East. There is no evidence that the foreign policy behavior of Arab states becomes risk averse when Israeli leaders might need an external scapegoat. These findings are discussed in the context of other research on enduring rivalries and strategic interaction.

Diversionary Dragons, or “Talking Tough in Taipei”: Cross-Strait Relations in the New Millennium

“…Both expectations are met for the period 1948-1998(Sprecher and DeRouen 2002. Sprecher and DeRouen (2005) also study Israel and consider the number of parties as a proxy for the government's vulnerability. They find that a larger number of parties in the cabinet are more likely to produce hostile actions.…”

“…Our extension builds upon the noteworthy finding from a large-n study that even weak states (democracies, in particular) as well as benevolent states can engage in diversionary uses of force (Pickering and Kisangani 2005;Kisangani and Pickering 2007). In addition, our study builds on the approach of Sprecher andDeRouen (2002, 2005), which emphasizes the contextual aspects of building a model for a given middle power. In the following section, we explain how and why Taiwan's political rhetoric about China can fit into the framework of DT and also how the theory needs to be adapted to better explain the Taiwan case.…”

“…Particularly, current empirical testing has been focused on a limited set of countries, with recent studies of Israel and its neighbors effectively expanding the US-based research program to at least one middle power in some depth (Sprecher andDeRouen 2002,2005).2 This rigorous study is an example of paying proper attention to context when attempting to assess DT for a middle power. The basic great power--centric model must be adapted to circumstances.…”

“…The basic great power--centric model must be adapted to circumstances. For example, Christopher Sprecher and Karl DeRouen (2005) assess whether Israeli military actions increase as a function of (a) domestic unrest and (b) external threat relationships. Both expectations are met for the period 1948-1998(Sprecher and DeRouen 2002.…”

“…For example, Christopher Sprecher and Karl DeRouen (2005) assess whether Israeli military actions increase as a function of (a) domestic unrest and (b) external threat relationships. Both expectations are met for the period 1948-1998(Sprecher and DeRouen 2002. Sprecher and DeRouen (2005) also study Israel and consider the number of parties as a proxy for the government's vulnerability.…”