2007
DOI: 10.1080/07036330601144409
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The Domestic Politics of British Policy on the Euro

Abstract: A wide variety of explanations have been applied by academics and journalists to explain the details of British government policy on the Euro. This article examines four leading explanations rooted in an analysis of domestic politics, arguing that British government reluctance to support Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership can be explained more in terms of ideologically infused intra-party politics and the realities of neo-pluralist (interest group) politics, while explanations rooted in an analysis o… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…In addition, the salience of the single currency in the PLP was such that Labour MPs against and in favour of membership took the unusual step of spelling out their views in open letters before the Blair government took office and on the very day of its landmark decision on the issue in October 1997 (Independent :14; Guardian :16). Later on in the Blair premiership, moreover, the single currency became the raison d’être of organized groups within the PLP on both sides of the argument (Howarth :4).…”
Section: Issue Salience and Noncompensatory Domestic Political Loss Amentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, the salience of the single currency in the PLP was such that Labour MPs against and in favour of membership took the unusual step of spelling out their views in open letters before the Blair government took office and on the very day of its landmark decision on the issue in October 1997 (Independent :14; Guardian :16). Later on in the Blair premiership, moreover, the single currency became the raison d’être of organized groups within the PLP on both sides of the argument (Howarth :4).…”
Section: Issue Salience and Noncompensatory Domestic Political Loss Amentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the Labour government's attempt to present the euro as merely a question of economic calculations has not proved effective. Parliament and the eurosceptic media have established a discursive consensus that the euro is one of the major political questions related to the fate of the UK as a sovereign state (Risse 2003;Howarth 2007). Consequently, to further reassure an anxious British public and avoid a difficult debate, the former Labour government promised that a decision to recommend joining the euro zone should not only be put to a vote in parliament, but also a referendum.…”
Section: Despite Continued Attempts By the British And Danish Governmmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The situation could have been more challenging had the UK joined EMU. This country has for many years had a business cycle not in sync with that of the average of the EMU countries (Artis, 2006;Howarth, 2006), even though in recent years the business cycle of that country has become more synchronised with that of the euro area. Some recent research suggests that being part of EMU may not further synchronise the business cycles of those countries in EMU (Gouveia and Correia, 2008).…”
Section: Claim 7: Participating Countries Need To Be In An Optimum Cumentioning
confidence: 99%