Abstract:A wide variety of explanations have been applied by academics and journalists to explain the details of British government policy on the Euro. This article examines four leading explanations rooted in an analysis of domestic politics, arguing that British government reluctance to support Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership can be explained more in terms of ideologically infused intra-party politics and the realities of neo-pluralist (interest group) politics, while explanations rooted in an analysis o… Show more
“…In addition, the salience of the single currency in the PLP was such that Labour MPs against and in favour of membership took the unusual step of spelling out their views in open letters before the Blair government took office and on the very day of its landmark decision on the issue in October 1997 (Independent :14; Guardian :16). Later on in the Blair premiership, moreover, the single currency became the raison d’être of organized groups within the PLP on both sides of the argument (Howarth :4).…”
Section: Issue Salience and Noncompensatory Domestic Political Loss Amentioning
The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making would benefit from being clearer in spelling out the conditions under which it holds more or less analytic promise. The article makes the case that the concept of issue salience can help the theory address its shortcomings in this respect. In particular, the explanatory power of poliheuristic theory's two‐stage model largely depends on the noncompensatory principle of major domestic political loss avoidance on the first stage of the model to simplify the choice set to be considered on the second stage. This is more likely to happen, however, in the case of issues that are highly salient to a government's selectorate than in the case of issues that are of low salience in the domestic arena. The poliheuristic theory should thus be more powerful if it is applied to domestic high‐salience rather than low‐salience decisions. These theoretical contentions are illustrated in a case study on the decision making of the British Labour government under Tony Blair in the fields of European security and defense policy and the single European currency.
“…In addition, the salience of the single currency in the PLP was such that Labour MPs against and in favour of membership took the unusual step of spelling out their views in open letters before the Blair government took office and on the very day of its landmark decision on the issue in October 1997 (Independent :14; Guardian :16). Later on in the Blair premiership, moreover, the single currency became the raison d’être of organized groups within the PLP on both sides of the argument (Howarth :4).…”
Section: Issue Salience and Noncompensatory Domestic Political Loss Amentioning
The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making would benefit from being clearer in spelling out the conditions under which it holds more or less analytic promise. The article makes the case that the concept of issue salience can help the theory address its shortcomings in this respect. In particular, the explanatory power of poliheuristic theory's two‐stage model largely depends on the noncompensatory principle of major domestic political loss avoidance on the first stage of the model to simplify the choice set to be considered on the second stage. This is more likely to happen, however, in the case of issues that are highly salient to a government's selectorate than in the case of issues that are of low salience in the domestic arena. The poliheuristic theory should thus be more powerful if it is applied to domestic high‐salience rather than low‐salience decisions. These theoretical contentions are illustrated in a case study on the decision making of the British Labour government under Tony Blair in the fields of European security and defense policy and the single European currency.
“…However, the Labour government's attempt to present the euro as merely a question of economic calculations has not proved effective. Parliament and the eurosceptic media have established a discursive consensus that the euro is one of the major political questions related to the fate of the UK as a sovereign state (Risse 2003;Howarth 2007). Consequently, to further reassure an anxious British public and avoid a difficult debate, the former Labour government promised that a decision to recommend joining the euro zone should not only be put to a vote in parliament, but also a referendum.…”
Section: Despite Continued Attempts By the British And Danish Governmmentioning
“…The situation could have been more challenging had the UK joined EMU. This country has for many years had a business cycle not in sync with that of the average of the EMU countries (Artis, 2006;Howarth, 2006), even though in recent years the business cycle of that country has become more synchronised with that of the euro area. Some recent research suggests that being part of EMU may not further synchronise the business cycles of those countries in EMU (Gouveia and Correia, 2008).…”
Section: Claim 7: Participating Countries Need To Be In An Optimum Cumentioning
This paper seeks to review a selection of ten salient critical claims about Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that were heard in the 1990s in either the Political Science literature or the Economics literature or both. In this paper, the author focuses on five salient Political Science claims and five Economics claims prominent at the time that pointed to problems with EMU that could undermine its viability. As we will see, based on an assessment of the first ten years of EMU, almost none of these claims -to date -turned out to be a problem.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.