The dual reading of general conditionals: The influence of abstract versus concrete contexts

Wang, Moyun; Yao, Xinyun

doi:10.1080/17470218.2017.1281321

Cited by 9 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 35 publications

(76 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We found that only the pq possibility is necessary for a true conditional, and the p¬q possibility is incompatible with the true conditional. This incompatibility is different from, but not in conflict with the previous finding that in set tasks with the manipulation of probability, people prefer the probabilistic reading (tolerating few exceptions) of general conditionals, in which p¬q is possible (Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003;Evans & Over, 2004;Geiger, & Oberauer, 2007;Oberauer, Geiger, Fischer, & Weidenfeld, 2007;Wang & Yao, 2018). In the present set tasks, different cases in a set are equiprobable.…”

Section: Relation To Existing Researchcontrasting

confidence: 87%

“…In set tasks about truth judgments of conditionals, some previous studies investigated whether the meaning of general conditionals (e.g., If a card is red, then it is round) is deterministic (exceptionless) or probabilistic (exception-tolerating) (Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003;Evans & Over, 2004;Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, & Kleiter, 2011;Geiger, & Oberauer, 2007;Goodwin, 2014;Oaksford & Chater, 2009;Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000;Oberauer, Geiger, Fischer, & Weidenfeld, 2007;Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003;Over & Cruz, 2018;Wang & Yao, 2018). In these studies, frequency information of the four truth table cases and P(q|p) were manipulated to examine whether participants tolerated exceptions to conditionals and whether truth judgments varied with P(q|p).…”

Section: Existing Empirical Studies and Their Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

What is required for the truth of a general conditional?

Wang¹

2020

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A current dispute in the psychology of conditionals is which possibility is necessary for basic conditionals such as if p then q. There are three accounts with different predictions about the question. The original model theory predicts that if p then q means the disjunction of three possibilities: possibly pq or possibly ¬pq or possibly ¬p¬q ( ¬ = “not”), in which each is unnecessary. The revised model theory predicts that it means the conjunction of the three possibilities, in which each is necessary. The suppositional theory predicts that people interpret it as a hypothetical test based on the conditional probability of p given q, in which only the pq possibility is necessary. Two experiments investigated possibility and truth judgments about basic conditionals given sets that consist of one or more of the four truth table cases of basic conditionals. The results demonstrate that both judgments approximate to the prediction of the suppositional theory rather than the original and revised model theory, and so people show the suppositional interpretation of basic conditionals, in which only the pq possibility is necessary for basic conditionals. Only the pq possibility is necessary for judging a basic conditional true. A true basic conditional mentally implies that only the pq possibility is necessary. These findings support the suppositional theory, but not the original and revised model theory.

show abstract

Section: Relation To Existing Researchcontrasting

confidence: 87%

Section: Existing Empirical Studies and Their Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is required for the truth of a general conditional?

Wang¹

2020

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The semantic violation interpretation of negated general disjunctions parallels the previous 34 finding that most participants judged a general conditional, if p then not q (e. g., if a card is round then it is red), false in a set containing p¬q cases where different cases were equiprobable by default (Wang & Yao, 2018). That the general conditional is false is equivalent to that the general conditional is not true, that is, the negation of the general conditional.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 70%

A rule violation account for the reading of negated general disjunctions

Wang¹

2021

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Few previous studies have investigated how people read the negation of a general disjunction that refers to a set of objects (It is not true that xs are p or q). We develop four alternative accounts for the negation. The original mental model theory interprets the negation as the negation of the disjunction of possibilities allowed by the general disjunction. The revised mental model theory interprets it as the negation of the conjunction of possibilities allowed by the general disjunction. The probabilistic violation account interprets it as the probabilistic violation of the general disjunction by introducing nonnegligible exceptions. A normative semantic violation account interprets the negation as the semantic qualitative violation of the general disjunction by introducing exceptions. Three experiments systematically investigated the reading of negated general disjunctions in different possibility and truth judgment tasks. Participants’ possibility and truth judgments provide convergent evidence that a negated general disjunction is consistent with only sets containing ¬p¬q cases regardless of whether other cases are present or not, and people prefer to the semantic violation interpretation of negated general disjunctions. These findings favour the semantic violation account over the other accounts. This implies that the core meaning of a general disjunction is the rule represented by it, but not the set of possibilities referred to by it.

show abstract

“…In concrete contexts with frequency information of the four cases, p¬q should be possible. This difference is suggested by the previous finding that people generally show the deterministic reading of conditionals without frequency information (e. g, if a card is round then it is red), but the probabilistic reading (tolerating a few exceptions) of conditionals with frequency information (Wang & Yao, 2018). Thus, for the instance modal question about a basic conditional without frequency information, the true conditional implies that pq is possible for the instance, and irrelevant ¬pq and ¬p¬q are also possible (this may be due to that logically they are not incompatible with the true conditional), but p¬q is impossible (Handley, Evans, & Thompson, 2006, p 565).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Consistency and inconsistency between instance and categorical modal inferences from conditionals

Wang¹

2021

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

For the modal meanings of conditionals with the form if p then q, there are three existing psychological accounts: the original suppositional theory, the original and revised mental models theory. They imply different modal meanings of if p then q. Alternatively, we propose a revised suppositional theory with the unique prediction that the set from which the instance referred to by a true conditional was randomly drawn, necessarily includes pq cases, and possibly includes ¬pq / ¬p¬q cases, but impossibly includes p¬q cases. One experiment investigated whether category modal inferences from a conditional would be consistent with preceding instance modal inferences from it. The results revealed that (1) previous instance inferences did not affect subsequent category inferences; (2) relevant cases pq and p¬q tended to elicit consistent response patterns, but irrelevant cases ¬pq and ¬p¬q tended to elicit inconsistent response patterns; (3) the overall response pattern of category inferences is consistent with only the prediction of the revised suppositional theory. The latter implies that only the pq possibility is required by a true conditional, but the ¬pq / ¬p¬q possibility is unrequired. On the whole, these findings favor the revised suppositional theory over the other accounts.

show abstract

The dual reading of general conditionals: The influence of abstract versus concrete contexts

Cited by 9 publications

References 35 publications

What is required for the truth of a general conditional?

What is required for the truth of a general conditional?

A rule violation account for the reading of negated general disjunctions

Consistency and inconsistency between instance and categorical modal inferences from conditionals

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About