The Dynamics of Climate Agreements

Harstad, Bård

doi:10.1111/jeea.12138

Cited by 82 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…There is also no inter-temporal carbon leakage because the model is static. 19 Moreover, the usual caveat applies that our model is a rather stylized description of complex climate change negotiations.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate Policies with Private Information: The Case for Unilateral Action

Helm¹,

Wirl²

2016

Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Econom

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractCountries often have private information about their willingness to pay for protecting the climate system and their cost of emission reductions. We use a principal-agent model to re-examine the economic case for unilateral action by individual countries, in our case of the principal. We …nd that the incentive structure that arises in an incomplete information framework can motivate (i) unilateral action before contract negotiations, (ii) optimal contracts in which the principal accepts higher marginal abatement costs for herself, as well as (iii) overcompliance by the principal after the contract has been negotiated. Multilateral externalities and type-dependent outside options, which are characteristic for climate policies, play a crucial role to explain these results.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate Policies with Private Information: The Case for Unilateral Action

Helm¹,

Wirl²

2016

Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Econom

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“…This negative outcome is more likely to arise, the weaker the intellectual property rights, the shorter the length of the agreement, and the larger the number of countries. In contrast with Harstad (2015), where IEAs start at time zero, we have an explicit pre-agreement period where emissions are decided non-cooperatively, and we focus on emission decisions only. Moreover, in Harstad (2015) and Harstad (2012) the equilibrium in the BAU case is not affected by the IEA that will prevail in the future.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In contrast with Harstad (2015), where IEAs start at time zero, we have an explicit pre-agreement period where emissions are decided non-cooperatively, and we focus on emission decisions only. Moreover, in Harstad (2015) and Harstad (2012) the equilibrium in the BAU case is not affected by the IEA that will prevail in the future. This feature is due to (i) the possibility to invest in technology and (ii) the fact that the investment costs are linear.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anticipated international environmental agreements

Açıkgöz

Benchekroun

2017

European Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Anticipated International Environmental Agreements AbstractConsider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement (IEA) to be in effect sometime in the future. What is the impact of the future IEA on current emissions after its announcement? We show that the answer to this question is ambiguous. We examine four types of IEAs that aim to reduce pollution stock in the environment. IEA type 1 sets a level of emissions, IEA type 2 and IEA type 3 set a percentage and a uniform cut vis-à-vis the business-as-usual policy respectively. IEA type 4 sets the policy that maximizes future joint benefits of the signatories. We show that all of these agreements reach their goal in the long run, but the intended benefits of these IEAs can potentially be offset by the anticipatory noncooperative response of the signatories, leading to an environmental degradation in the short run. Which IEA is preferable depends on the targeted level emissions during the phase of cooperation. When this target is above a certain threshold, welfare under IEA type 1 is larger than under IEA type 2 which is larger than under IEA type 3. Moreover, the highest level of welfare that can be attained under IEA type 1 is above the highest level of welfare achieved by any one of the other three IEAs.JEL-Codes: Q530, Q540, Q580, Q590.

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“…They distinguish between community and impartial altruism and …nd that community altruism, i.e. the exclusion 5 Another strand of the literature studies the relationship between R&D investment in cleaner technologies and international cooperation but assuming that participation is exogenously given (see Buchholz and Konrad (1994), Beccherle and Tirole (2011), Harstad (2012Harstad ( , 2015 and Schmidt and Strausz (2014)). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sharing R&D investments in breakthrough technologies to control climate change

Rubio¹

2017

Oxf. Econ. Pap.

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This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, a three-stage technology agreement formation game is solved.First, countries decide whether or not to sign up to the agreement. Then, in the second stage, the signatories (playing together) and the non-signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D. In this stage, it is assumed that the signatories not only coordinate their levels of R&D investment but also pool their R&D e¤orts to fully internalize the spillovers of their investment in innovation. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides non-cooperatively upon its level of energy production. Emissions depend on the decisions made regarding investment and production. If a country decides to develop a breakthrough technology in the second stage, its emissions will be zero in the third stage. For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment costs, the grand coalition is stable if marginal damages are large enough to justify the development of a breakthrough technology that eliminates emissions completely, and if technology spillovers are not very important.

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The Dynamics of Climate Agreements

Cited by 82 publications

References 60 publications

Climate Policies with Private Information: The Case for Unilateral Action

Climate Policies with Private Information: The Case for Unilateral Action

Anticipated international environmental agreements

Sharing R&D investments in breakthrough technologies to control climate change

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