The Dynamics of Critical Realignments: An Analysis Across Time and Space

Abstract

During critical realignments, citizens are able to reject past habitual behaviors to produce fundamental changes in the partisan balance. These realignments may be produced by any of three dynamics: the conversion of active partisans, the mobilization of inactive citizens, or the demobilization of active voters. Determining which dynamics have produced critical realignments is essential for understanding how citizens hold political elites accountable and forge nonincremental political change. This paper makes three central contributions to our understanding of these dynamics. In contrast to previous studies, we examine the dynamics of all presidential realignments in American electoral history. Where previous studies have focused on national, sectional, or state levels of analysis, we focus on city-and county-level realignments, a critical advancement for an inherently local-level phenomenon such as critical realignments. Finally, unlike previous studies, we identify the factors that promote particular realignment dynamics. We find that the conversion of active partisans has produced most of the enduring change in local electoral behavior in the United States, with the relative contribution of different dynamics varying both across time and space. Political factors such as the strength of state and local parties, social factors such as the strength of local social networks, and demographic factors, such as the sizes of local immigrant populations, have each favored particular realignment dynamics in American electoral history.

Presidential Versus Vice Presidential Home State Advantage: A Comparative Analysis of Electoral Significance, Causes, and Processes, 1884‐2008

“…The integrity of our inferential strategy is supported by analogous arguments in the realignment literature. Darmofal and Nardulli (, 261), for example, provided this guide for distinguishing between realignment caused by conversion versus mobilization:

if conversion of voters is responsible for all of the enduring change in the locale, there will be a shift in the core partisan voting populations for the affected parties with no shift in the size of the overall core electorate. If mobilization is the operative dynamic, there will be an enlargement in the size of the core electorate and a relatively greater increase in the size of one of the partisan core voting populations

…”

“…Stated more concisely:

Conversion requires a shift among core voters, but no change in the size of the core electorate. Mobilization involves both an enlargement in the size of the core electorate and a relatively greater increase in one of the major party constituencies, but no reshuffling among core partisans (Darmofal and Nardulli , 261).

Like realignment scholars, we use changes in the size of the electorate and partisan performance to draw inferences about the process underlying aggregate vote shifts. The major difference between our approaches is not conceptual, but temporal; realignment scholars seek to explain long‐term shifts in partisan preference, whereas we seek to explain episodic shocks to partisan preference.…”

“…Conversion requires a shift among core voters, but no change in the size of the core electorate. Mobilization involves both an enlargement in the size of the core electorate and a relatively greater increase in one of the major party constituencies, but no reshuffling among core partisans (Darmofal and Nardulli , 261).…”

“…Our findings fit only with an explanation based primarily on voter conversion. Recall language previously cited from Darmofal and Nardulli (, 261): “ Conversion requires a shift among core voters, but no change in the size of the core electorate.” Indeed, we find no statistically significant change in home state turnout for vice presidential candidates, on average. Moreover, when there are fluctuations in home state turnout, they have no discernible impact on vote choice.…”

“…Realignment scholars have vigorously debated whether to attribute critical elections and subsequent realignments to the conversion of existing voters or to the mobilization of new voters . Advocates of the conversion hypothesis are many (Burnham ; Darmofal and Nardulli ; Erikson and Tedin , ; Ladd and Hadley ; Sundquist ). They contend that realignments are attributable to the disproportionate conversion of established voters toward identification with, and electoral support for, one major party.…”