The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market

Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation

“…Using the firm-optimal stable matching as the solution concept for centralized models of matching markets, Gale and Sotomayor (1985) showed that increasing the number of applicants in the market while keeping the firm preferences unchanged within the old applicant set cannot make any firm worse off (Proposition 2, p. 264). 14 We can state a similar result on our domain, if we confine our attention to the late hiring stage.…”

School choice: an experimental study

“…The Minneapolis strategy advocates that the reported top choice should be the true top choice, while the reported second or third choice should be a child's district school or a school with a large capacity (schools C-G). We find that, in the Boston mechanism treatments in our experiment, 18 SUPPORT: Under BOS, in the designed environment, the average payoff from the Minneapolis strategy is 10.967, while the average payoff from other misrepresentations is 11.235. A t-test under the null hypothesis of equal mean yields a p-value of 0.685.…”

Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance

“…Once some applicants are ready to accept early offers, they impose a negative externality on high quality firms, making the whole market move early. We have seen in other environments that to successfully halt unraveling, a major factor is that applicants must be willing to reject early offers (Kagel and Roth 2000;McKinney, Niederle, and Roth 2005;Ünver 2001;Haruvy, Roth, and Ünver 2006). When offers are open, or when applicants can renege on their acceptances, then the market does not have to depend on applicants' willingness to reject early offers to have most of its transactions happen efficiently late.…”