The dynamics of national oil companies

Olorunfemi, Michael A.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0076.1991.tb00411.x

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…The claim of Morse (, p.14) that, ‘RN has practically disappeared from the discourse of international relations’ is exaggerated. There were passing references to RN in the 1980s and 1990s (see, for instance, Olorunfemi, ; Yoon‐Dae and Sang, ). However, it is true that in the context of the geographic diversification of oil extraction, the novel trend towards market determination of oil pricing (Yergin, ) and the wider ideological ascendency of the Washington consensus, RN was mentioned less because it was less conspicuous.…”

Section: Periodising Resource Nationalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Resource Nationalism

Pryke

2017

Global Policy

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This article attempts to dissect the term resource nationalism (hereafter RN). It looks first at the origins of the term. Second, it examines various definitions of RN: in the business press where a zero sum conception of state and corporate interest is generally assumed, related definitions in academic writings that hinge on the relative control of resources by government and company, explanations that subsume the phenomenon within economic nationalism, accounts that stress how it restricts outputs and, finally, recent discussions that question prevailing understandings of RN and emphasise instead the diversity of its contemporary forms. The article then considers drivers of RN: the capture of economic rents, the corollary of the influence of market prices on this objective, obsolescing bargaining, the pressures of natural scarcity and the role of national identity. Fourth, the global context, commercial and legal, in which RN operates. Finally, the article considers the fluctuations in RN in recent years.

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Section: Periodising Resource Nationalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Resource Nationalism

Pryke

2017

Global Policy

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“…Given the political management of NOCs, their goals often diverge from those of private oil companies (Losman, 2010;Luong & Weinthal, 2010;Olorunfemi, 1991;Victor et al, 2012). As they can control NOCs to a greater extent at a lower cost than they can control private oil companies, the idea of using NOCs to allocate resources is appealing to governments.…”

Section: Nocs As Instruments Of Political Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, while the existing literature recognizes that NOCs are the main instrument of government control over the energy sector and they often play a role in the allocation of fuel subsidies (Hartley & Medlock, 2008;Khan, 1987;Losman, 2010;Luong & Weinthal, 2010;Olorunfemi, 1991;Philip, 1982;Ross, 2012;Victor, Hults, & Thurber, 2012), systematic studies of NOC involvement in fuel subsidies do not exist. First, while the existing literature recognizes that NOCs are the main instrument of government control over the energy sector and they often play a role in the allocation of fuel subsidies (Hartley & Medlock, 2008;Khan, 1987;Losman, 2010;Luong & Weinthal, 2010;Olorunfemi, 1991;Philip, 1982;Ross, 2012;Victor, Hults, & Thurber, 2012), systematic studies of NOC involvement in fuel subsidies do not exist.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Instruments of Political Control

Cheon

Lackner

Urpelainen

2014

Comparative Political Studies

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Global petroleum subsidies peaked at US$520 billion in the summer of 2008 and reached US$212 billion in 2011, carrying high fiscal and environmental costs. Why do some countries spend so much money to subsidize petroleum consumption? Previous studies suggest that oil-rich autocracies lacking institutional capacity are the main culprits. However, they cannot explain why oil importers with capable bureaucracies, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Malaysia, subsidized petroleum products. We argue that governments in countries with national oil companies (NOCs) use petroleum subsidies to cushion the effects of increasing oil prices. Empirically, we examine the relationship between oil prices and domestic gasoline prices in 175 countries, 2002-2009. An NOC halves the effect of oil price increases on the domestic gasoline price. This effect is strongly associated with the institutional design of NOCs, as increased autonomy shields them from political interference by the government.

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“…The policy, based on geopolitical considerations, was devised to reduce other countries' incentives to take unwanted unilateral strategic actions (lEA, 1983). In addition, regional energy integration may be the result of national oil companies' recent vertical integration attempts (Olorunfemi, 1991).…”

Section: / Seementioning

confidence: 99%