The dynamics of the legal system

Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Deffains, Bruno; Lovat, Bruno

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.02.001

Cited by 11 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…Moreover, 30% of people who have ever had business before the courts admit that they did not understand the court rulings (Bargues and Ferey, 2002; François, 2003). This argument is consistent with recent research on the uncertainty of law (Dari-Mattiacci and Deffains, 2007; Dari-Mattiacci et al ., 2011). Legal uncertainty is generally defined as the difficulty to precisely know ex ante what the outcome of the judicial system will be ex post .…”

Section: The Justice Budget As a Signalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust in judicial institutions: an empirical approach

Roussey

Deffains

2012

Journal of Institutional Economics

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This paper investigates the relationship between judicial resources and individuals' trust in the justice system. We argue that the justice budget is likely to have a positive and significant impact on individuals' trust in justice, thanks to its role as a signal when individuals face uncertainty regarding the judicial environment. We test this hypothesis empirically using three different budget-related variables: the justice budget per incoming case, the number of magistrates and the intensity of legal aid. Across our three regressions, we find a positive and significant correlation between judicial resources and individuals' declared trust in the justice system. This positive relationship is robust to the introduction of socio-demographic, cultural, institutional and economic control variables. We finally offer empirical support to the intuition that the effect of the justice budget on trust in justice is likely to be greater when individuals are more satisfied with the level of democracy in their country. * The authors would like to thank the members of the CEPEJ working group on the evaluation of judicial systems for kindly providing data and fruitful interactions. We are grateful to Eve Caroli for her very constructive comments. We also thank Eshien Chong for his enthusiastic help and Henri Fraisse, Céline Bignebat, Claudine Desrieux, Claude Parthenay, Massimo D'Antoni and three anonymous referees of the journal for their valuable suggestions. Of course, all errors remain ours.

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Section: The Justice Budget As a Signalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust in judicial institutions: an empirical approach

Roussey

Deffains

2012

Journal of Institutional Economics

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“…ENGOs may go to court in order to inform regulators about the gap that exists between safety standards and victims' preferences. Consequently, ENGOs specific legal actions may be interpreted as an input in the regulatory process of designing optimal standards of care (Dari-Mattiacci et al, 2011). Indeed, ENGOs' legal actions are very homogeneous.…”

Section: A Demand For Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Engos in Environmental Litigation: A French case study

Bentata

Faure

2015

Env Pol Gov

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Both lawyers and economists are enthusiastic about the role of environmental non‐governmental organizations (ENGOs). However, when dealing with ENGOs, most academic studies focus only on their actions as interest/pressure groups and no systematic empirical research exists addressing the question of how ENGOs use environmental litigation and courts to fill their goals. In this article, we try to observe whether ENGOs have specific goals and specific strategies in trials. We do this on the basis of a unique database consisting of the entire set of environmental cases judged by the French Supreme Court during 1956–2010. We conclude that ENGOs' legal actions encourage compliance with regulation and help solve civil liability failures, especially causal uncertainty and victims' apathy. Finally, we observe that ENGOs act as latent interest groups that become active only under specific circumstances to ask for more stringent regulation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

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Conjectures and underpricing in repeated mass disputes with heterogeneous plaintiffs

Rampa

Saraceno

2022

J Econ

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The dynamics of the legal system

Cited by 11 publications

References 66 publications

Trust in judicial institutions: an empirical approach

Trust in judicial institutions: an empirical approach

The Role of Engos in Environmental Litigation: A French case study

Conjectures and underpricing in repeated mass disputes with heterogeneous plaintiffs

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