The Economic Costs of Organised Crime: Evidence from Southern Italy

Pinotti, Paolo

doi:10.1111/ecoj.12235

Cited by 252 publications

(139 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Consequently, the slope of the GDP per capita gap for Guerrero and Michoacán seems to keep getting steeper. In line with the findings for the Basque and Italian conflict cases by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Pinotti (2015), respectively, the main effect of drug-related violence on GDP per capita in Mexico occurs with a one-year lag.…”

Section: Effect Of Drug-related Violence On Gdp Per Capitasupporting

confidence: 83%

The Economic Consequences of the Mexican Drug War

Miyar

2016

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

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Military crackdowns often disrupt economic development by exacerbating violence. This paper examines the case of the Mexican Drug War, employing synthetic control methods. To prove causality, I use variation on statewide military operations, as well as the rollout of the war. Findings indicate a decrease in GDP per capita equal to 0.5%, in states with military operations. Determinants by which the Mexican Drug War hampered economic development include a proportional reduction in consumption per capita, and a decline in productive investment of at least 0.3%, driven by a drop of 3.2% in commercial credit granted to businesses.

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Section: Effect Of Drug-related Violence On Gdp Per Capitasupporting

confidence: 83%

The Economic Consequences of the Mexican Drug War

Miyar

2016

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

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“…24 The second term in the equation is the interaction of each of the period dummies with the dummy M af ia, which takes a value of 1 in areas particularly affected by organized crime. This term allows us to consider the differential effect of each period in cities affected by high levels of organized crime.…”

Section: Identification Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Mafia, elections and violence against politicians

Daniele

Dipoppa

2017

Journal of Public Economics

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Organized crime uses political violence to influence politics in a wide set of countries. This paper exploits a novel dataset of attacks directed towards Italian local politicians to study how (and why) criminal organizations use violence against them. We test two competing theories to predict the use of violence i) before elections, to affect the electoral outcome and ii) after elections, to influence politicians from the beginning of their term. We provide causal evidence in favor of the latter hypothesis. The probability of being a target of violence increases in the weeks right after an election in areas with a high presence of organized crime, especially when elections result in a change of local government.JEL Codes: H00, D72

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“…Pinotti (2015) shows that these two Italy's regions fell pray of organized crime approximately during the same years in which Abruzzo and Molise started to enjoy the benefits of secession. Therefore, having Apulia and Basilicata as controls might lead to overestimation of the split, to the extent that organized crime deters economic growth.…”

Section: Robustness Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The synthetic control has been pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), 16 and it has also been used for the analysis of regional developments in Italy (see, for instance, Barone and Mocetti, 2014;Pinotti, 2015;Barone, David, and de Blasio, 2016). The method can be easily sketched.…”

Section: The Synthetic Control Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Local secessions, homophily, and growth. A model with some evidence from the regions of Abruzzo and Molise (Italy, 1963)

Dalmazzo

Blasio

Poy

2018

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. ABSTRACT This paper analyses the case of a local secession, i.e. the birth of a new local jurisdiction by separation from an existing one. We present a stylized model in which society is composed of heterogeneous groups and individuals have an homophily bias. The model predicts that: i) separations, such as the split of a territory into distinct administrative units, occur when the costs of mixed communities are sufficiently large; ii) the smaller community drives the decision to secede; iii) welfare gains from the split are associated with positive population growth; iv) higher payoffs under separations, however, might be related to taste for sameness only, with no (or even negative) effect on economic growth. Then, we bring the model to the data by exploiting the secession of the Italian region of Molise from Abruzzo, a unique event in Italian history, which took place in 1963. Historical records document that the split was the result of pressures from Molise, the smaller community. Our evidence suggests that the split was associated with population inflows in both areas. Finally, the main empirical findings, derived by using a synthetic control approach, show that the split caused significant benefits, in both regions, in terms of per-capita GDP growth. Terms of use: Documents in

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The Economic Costs of Organised Crime: Evidence from Southern Italy

Cited by 252 publications

References 49 publications

The Economic Consequences of the Mexican Drug War

The Economic Consequences of the Mexican Drug War

Mafia, elections and violence against politicians

Local secessions, homophily, and growth. A model with some evidence from the regions of Abruzzo and Molise (Italy, 1963)

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