The Economic Crisis (2009–2013) and Electoral Support for the Radical Right in Western Europe—Some New and Unexpected Findings

Abstract

Objectives This article evaluates the influence of the economic crisis (2009–2013) on the vote share of the radical right in Western European regions. I ask two questions: (1) Has the radical right electorally benefited from the recession that has hit Western Europe in the aftermath of the U.S. and European stock market crisis in 2008/2009? (2) Has it performed particularly well in areas that have been very hard hit by the crisis? Methods I evaluate both questions in a longitudinal and multivariate framework through pooled time series analysis. The analysis, which controls for immigration, the education level of the region, and population density, covers more than 150 regions in 17 European countries from 1990 to 2013. Results First, I find that the 2009 to 2013 economic crisis has merely triggered a very moderate increase of 1 percentage point in the aggregate average regional vote share of the radical right. Second, and with the exception of regions in Greece and France, my results also indicate that the radical right has had the strongest electoral gains in regions and countries that have been relatively spared from the gust of the crisis. Conclusion This quantitative study highlights that an economic crisis is no panacea for the success of the radical right.

Ethno‐nationalist populism and the mobilization of collective resentment

“…These findings suggest that populism, ethno-nationalism and, to a lesser degree, authoritarianism are not new features of contemporary US and European politics. Indeed, when it comes to electoral outcomes, these three elements of the radical-right's political repertoire were successfully employed in Europe well before the Eurozone crisis, which many analysts, erroneously, interpret as the central precipitating event in the history of populist politics (Mudde 2013;Stockemer 2017). If anything, the immediate aftermath of the crisis saw a temporary decline in the fortunes of the radical right across a number of countries, as voters were more concerned with economic issues than immigration (Golder 2016; Kriesi and Pappas 2015).…”

Anti-Establishment Radical Parties in 21st Century Europe

“…There also seems to be a moderately strong relationship between education, age, views on the economy, and trust in existing political parties and the likelihood to vote for the radical-right. This seems to be in line with the literature on these parties indentifying unemployment, the economy as well as views on immigration as critical towards determining radical right party vote (Kitschelt 1995;Stockemer 2014).…”

“…Negative views of immigrants are among the strongest determinants of radical-right party vote. It also confirms some of the literature on economic variables or voters' perceptions of the economy (Kitschelt 1995;Jackman and Volpert 1996;Pammett and Leduc 2013;Stockemer 2014). This however is a micro-level variable.…”

Räumliche Aspekte rechter Orientierungen Auf dem Weg zu einem konzeptionellen Rahmen

“…Ökologische Analysen arbeiten auf der Ebene von Regionen (z.B. Dandoy, 2013;Plesivcak, 2017;Stockemer, 2017;Abbondanza & Bailo, 2018), Gemeinden (z.B. Della Posta, 2013; Van der Waal, de Koster & Achterberg, 2013), Wahlkreisen oder Nachbarschaften (z.B.…”

“…Im Gegenteil gewinnen rechte Parteien insbesondere in den Regionen der EU an Zustimmung, die lediglich moderat von den Auswirkungen der Krise betroffen waren. Dies erklärt der Autor mit der Angst vor zukünftigen Wohlstandsverlusten (Stockemer, 2017). In britischen und österreichischen altindustriellen Regionen, die den Strukturwandel langsamer vollziehen und hohe Arbeitslosenquoten aufweisen, sind auch die Zustimmungswerte für rechte Parteien höher, was für die oben formulierten Thesen spricht (Ford & Goodwin, 2010;Goodwin & Harris, 2013;Essletzbichler, Disslbacher & Moser, 2018).…”