The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers

Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids

“…The risk in bid premia subsequent to the Williams Act described by Jarrell and Bradley (1980) is consistent with this hypothesis. An alternative truncation hypothesis is that a rise in the cost of bidding will raise the average bid premium by deterring profitable takeovers with relatively lower gains.28 Overbidding can explain not only the higher premia paid to targets but also the lower abnormal returns to bidders, found by Jarrell and Bradley, after the Williams Act and later state acts.29 Malatesta and Thompson (1988) provide evidence that a wealth transfer from bidders to targets (i.e., higher bids) was more important than truncation of the sample in causing the rise in target mean premia and lower abnormal returns to bidders.…”

The Creation of Value for Shareholders in Tender Offers: An Empirical Investigation on the Italian Stock Market

“…Among the works which focus on Tender Offers, some of which are illustrated in Table 2, the results are not always converging. Many studies, in fact, seem to suggest the creation of value for the shareholders of the companies involved (Dodd & Ruback, 1977;Kummer & Hoffmeister, 1978;Bradley, 1980;Jarrell & Bradley, 1980;Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1988;Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989;Lang, Stulz, & Walkling, 1989, Smith & Kim, 1994Bigelli & Mengoli, 1999). Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) and the results refer only to Tender offers.…”

The Post-Merger Performance: Evidence From Italy

“…The results found do not allow to come to a clear conclusion 1 . For example Dodd and Ruback (1977), Kummer and Hoffmeister (1978), Bradley 2 (1980), Jarrell and Bradley (1980), Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and Franks and Harris (1989), found significantly positive values for both bidder and target companies. Smith and Kim (1994) confirmed negative values throughout the pre and post acquisition period.…”